No Minister
They could have been used on a number of occasions.
I wonder how many people remember that they were offered up for the first gulf war, snapped up in the early lollie scramble. But by the time the politicians deliberated - and gave the official approval to
talk through the
concept, it was too late there were more than enough attack aircraft to do the job but not enough logistics aircraft, hence the C-130 deployment. Our decision making was just not agile enough.
- Hardly the capability's fault.
It appears from the minister's statement we still have some lessons waiting to be
re-learned:An example we should look at is Timor. Timor could have cooked off and if it had, then having a good CAS aircraft would have been decisive. (Their presence in the Orbat may have contributed to the stability). The real hard politik of this is 20 -30 body bags at Ohakea from a descent Infantry Contact ! - yes this is the reality of War - yes it does happen - and for every body bag, there's probably twice the number in non fatal casualties. If you know your Vietnam History (and I know Wayne does), there were copious situations where Infantry Coys came off worse for wear (and not just US ones
seeking engagement) and also plenty of situations of people saved by close air support. For a small nation this should be a particular concern as it will reappear one day
Those who have seen the end of war are the dead!As an adjunct, if the public thought that the RAAF could have done this as well as the A-4, they are, in my opinion wrong -(the argument of let other people do it). The F-18s at the time had been focused on Air to Air mission after getting touched up buy the Malaysians a few years earlier (shudders went all they way to Washington and Aussies got the AMRAAM). An F-18 was photographed at Ohakea once with rocket pods on just to prove that they could be put on!
As for the Pig well, I think as far as risk /cost and utility the RNZAF A-4 vs the Pig in Timor doing CAS for real - no competition. I think if the situation in Timor demanded CAS then the RNZAF would probably have been flying for the Aussie Army as well.
The devils advocate on this could be that a US carrier could have done this.
This is a profession at arms issue - The A-4 is
still the ideal platform for our region. - Regional engagement defined as your back yard where you have NO realistic choice but to be involved.
Soft Politik. The Asean nations don't like standing Army's on their soil (who can blame them) - hence the NZ Army Batallion return. -Things have moved on since the 1960s. A credible A-4 team that rocked up every now and then and did a good job gained NZ huge Kudos with these nations. (Trade). So we used them all the time!!!!!
So lets recap what the A-4 capability gave us:
The ability to do CAS in our region if it gets dicey.
We forget this.The ability to get our Navy and Army to DLOC for coalition operations.
We forgot this and now we really struggle.Good will military exchange with Asean nations in an area THEY appreciated.
The ability to monitor what these nations were doing with Air Power through such exchanges.
The ability to do serious coalition operations (Iraq - AG) if required.
Yes the A4- could be doing similar work to the A-10s in AG The point has been already raised overseas in some circles that cheap dedicated CAS platforms like the A-4 ( and its Dad the A-1) should still part of the tool box, and their modern equivalents are not with us.
All for the cost of probably an..... NH90 Sqn?
All those engineer boffins who point out the increased age and airframe costs...I counter by pointing out that many nations are still using A-4s, it was not impossible to keep the A-4 going (will be soon) and that to keep the A-4 in service would have been better than no Air Power capability at all. Future war is going to get very complex and we are going to need a broad range of tools and options to achieve our missions. The Timor example above also showed how although we remind ourselvse not to fight the last war, we do forget basic ABCs sometimes.
IMHO The real issues here and on all the threads re A4 et al, is that what's been missing is Joint Development of capabilities (not Army naffing off to buy LAV lemon and RNZAF off to buy F-16) and acceptance/understanding of Air Power. Things don't change that much and when you think of the state of the play with the RNZAF today, Boom Trenchards view would we have chosen option one, an Air force subservient to the Army and Navy needs. Air Power is not recognised in this country as an effect all on its own. The chicken egg scenario is that to do this, we need strong political leadership and guidance as to what they want the NZDF to do. I think you will find this is the heart of the matter. The political leaders have no real understanding of the profession at Arms and yet make the most crucial decisions. In theory they take guidance from the MoD - well hmm...
My money is on the UAVs - when you get down to it, the future and new technology in Mil Aviaiton. Our Air Force is a sleeping giant in this area.