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Post by Dave Homewood on Apr 11, 2019 10:14:27 GMT 12
Yes it may seem implausible, but then most of the clandestine spy activity that went on in WWII seems implausible too, yet it happened.
I don't know whether to believe the Coromandel story at all, it probably didn't happen but if it did it would not be that hard to cover up.
I knew someone actually involved in the Ratana case. He was in the Army at the time and elements of his battalion was moved in secret onto the hills that looked down onto the beach and they set up observation posts for months. This was because local people had indeed seen signalling from the beach in the form of Morse code flashing, and witnessed the same out at sea. He said they were told the authorities believed members of the Ratana pa were signalling the enemy and supplying submarines. They watched round the clock for months and saw nothing. Then he joined the RNZAF.
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Post by pepe on Apr 11, 2019 17:10:00 GMT 12
Yes it may seem implausible, but then most of the clandestine spy activity that went on in WWII seems implausible too, yet it happened. I don't know whether to believe the Coromandel story at all, it probably didn't happen but if it did it would not be that hard to cover up. I knew someone actually involved in the Ratana case. He was in the Army at the time and elements of his battalion was moved in secret onto the hills that looked down onto the beach and they set up observation posts for months. This was because local people had indeed seen signalling from the beach in the form of Morse code flashing, and witnessed the same out at sea. He said they were told the authorities believed members of the Ratana pa were signalling the enemy and supplying submarines. They watched round the clock for months and saw nothing. Then he joined the RNZAF. Thanks Dave, very interesting background indeed. I suppose that the Ratana were always going to be under some suspicion due to previous good relations with the Japanese and T.W. Ratana's theories in regards to Maori and Japanese both being from the lost tribes of Israel. I'm not that well researched, but the most successful spy operations seem to have occurred in occupied territories (e.g. France, Netherlands) where significant local assistance was available and the rewards were greater. If the New Zealand stories are to be believed the Japanese are risking relatively valuable resources for minimal returns.
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Post by Dave Homewood on Apr 11, 2019 17:30:21 GMT 12
It turns out that recent research has revealed Germany had a pretty decent spy network in Britain in WWII. Everyone was warned to watch for them in WWII, but post war it was all denied that they had anything more than a handful of people who were quickly rounded up. But the reality was there were big rings of spies all the way up into Parliament.
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Post by davidd on Apr 11, 2019 18:40:41 GMT 12
I always thought the Germans had to rely to an extent on a few Russian (Soviet) spies in the UK early in the war, as my understanding is that Germany had the greatest difficulty in inserting spies, and even if they got them in, the vast majority were rounded up very quickly as they tended to give themselves away by simply being "too British". This of course is the popular explanation. The Russians certainly seemed to have a few "super-spies" deeply entrenched in the British (and other foreign) establishments, and they had probably been there for quite a long time. As Britain felt itself under siege at this time (1940/41), they tended to be very alert for people that didn't quite fit in with the scenery. I also find it hard to believe that there were "big rings of spies all the way up into Parliament" in the UK - but even if they had they seem to have provided very little, if any useful intelligence that did Germany any good. The Nazis also attempted to set up spy rings in the USA earlier in the war (including pre-Pearl harbour), but again I doubt that they achieved very much of any significance. South America also came under Nazi pressure, but they seem to have achieved very little in that continent. America itself became convinced that their country was crawling with Nazi sympathisers and saboteurs, and hunted for them mercilessly. However very little genuine evidence was ever uncovered (although lots of "suspects" were pushed forward by suspicious fellow workers), and practically all of the "sabotage" apparently inflicted on American wartime production was more likely to have been a result of hastily trained workers attempting to keep up with (often unrealistically) accelerated production schedules rather than by deliberate malicious damage. What is the source of all this new spy information anyway? There was even talk in NZ of some of our Harvards, Hudsons in 1941/42, and later possibly even Corsairs being sabotaged at the factory of origin, but so far as I know, none of these cases was ever proved to be any such thing. We also received some Catalinas (Canadian-built, but later in the war) which had badly adjusted valve tappets in their engines (fortunately this was picked up in the USA during "shake-down" flying, prior to their delivery flights), but this was never suspected to be sabotage and was rightly blamed on rushed production and poor inspections by line inspectors, as were other faulty critical parts on Catalinas, such as gear boxes which operated the retractable wingtip floats, and leaking wing fuel tanks. By this time the hue and cry (one could use the word paranoia) which surrounded earlier discoveries of faulty parts and other maladjustments, had practically evaporated, as it was slowly realized that sabotage was highly unlikely during production, or even in service. There may have been isolated instances of some disgruntled mechanic or assembly worker taking out his frustrations on aircraft parts (or any other war material) but organized sabotage on any scale would be extremely difficult to carry out without fellow workers noticing, what with the number of inspectors and other workers who might come across such malpractices, and close investigation of unexpected failures of any components in service. However there were some spectacular failures in certain items, such as R-2600 Wright engines fitted in B-25s and A-20s delivered to New Guinea in 1943/44, which suffered badly from interior rust while in open storage at supply depots, and involving hundreds of engines. I have never seen any actual cause advanced for this problem, but suspicion seems to have been that incorrect specification steel had been used to manufacture the cylinders. However you would have to wonder about the wisdom of storing aircraft such as these out of doors in a humid climate without a regular "turn-over" regime in place for extended periods. Nevertheless other R-2600 engines on other aircraft did not suffer from such problems, such as our own TBFs, although production of the R-2600 was carried out in different factories which could explain different outcomes between Army and Navy engines. Just a few of my thoughts on WW2 sabotage in production facilities, and effectiveness of undercover spies, for what it is worth. David D
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Post by Dave Homewood on Apr 11, 2019 19:28:58 GMT 12
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Post by davidd on Apr 11, 2019 23:15:18 GMT 12
Well, after listening to this interview, I must confess that German attempts to get information from the 5th Column operating in the UK (Nazi sympathisers, or more importantly, Jew haters) were even less successful than I had believed, and the numbers of traitors were very much smaller as well; in Snow's own words, "hundreds, not thousands". There also seems to have been practically NO German spies in the UK during the war, which was always my belief; practically the entire intelligence gathering apparatus was British. Of the British fascists, a large proportion of whom seem to have been known to MI5, "several hundred" were interned by the British govt, and eventually 70 were prosecuted for various acts of spying and sabotage, although from what I can gather, none of these attempts was particularly spectacular and many were probably arrested whilst attempting such activities, such as cutting telephone lines. Snow believed that several ships may have been lost due to information being leaked by the fascists, although it would be interesting to know if any particular British ships involved could actually be named. Four of those prosecuted were sentenced to death, although only two were actually killed, other two had their sentences commuted. Typically for MI5 and the British government generally, Snow said he was surprised that the most senior of the British fascists (members of the British aristocracy, MPs, etc.), who comprised a good proportion of the leaders of the movement, were treated most leniently by MI 5 and the courts, and the Govt was very concerned to keep their involvement out of the papers, and they received the least severe of all the sentences handed down, whilst the ordinary "foot soldiers" of the movement were punished very severely. Overall my impression of the effectiveness of this movement was that it was absolutely minimal, and that MI 5 was able to keep them in check for most of the war, and that it should not be counted as an ever-present menace able to rise up and help defeat the British armed forces when the German armies arrived on British soil (which was their planned role in their own eyes). Their numbers were just ridiculously, pitifully small, and practically all their important leaders were too well known to the authorities, so many of the groups had to operate in small cells with little outside help, or communication with other groups. These are my impressions of the Snow interview. No doubt the book would make an interesting read, but I doubt it would change my mind on the effectiveness of the British fascist movement of the late 1930s and through WW2, nor its potential to create much of a stir in the UK, even in the event of a German invasion of the UK.
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Post by Dave Homewood on Apr 11, 2019 23:47:59 GMT 12
Yes, I think they may have come into their own had the Germans invaded though with sabotage to the defences, etc.
I heard another show similar in vain but I think on the BBC, not on the same topic but very similar about spies in Britain and it was interesting too. I am trying to remember which show it was on.
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Post by isc on Apr 11, 2019 23:49:42 GMT 12
I have a book somewhere, "Winning the Radar War" by Jack Nissen, a chap that dad met in UK while he was there as an RNZAF Radar mechanic. In the book is a bit about Hitler Youth groups doing cycle tours in1938/39 with cameras, virtually photographing anything that might be of interest. isc
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Post by Dave Homewood on May 31, 2019 23:47:02 GMT 12
No. 3 Squadron Operations Record Book 2 March 1944 RNZAF Station Ohakea
Four Hudsons assisted 6 Ansons and 5 Avengers to carry out Parallel track search from Cape Palliser to Portland isles to try and locate enemy submarine reported in that area. All the machines had to cancel the operation due to inclement weather.
Hudson NZ2090 - F/Lt Clarry Parker and Crew A/S Search 0655hrs to 0924hrs
Hudson NZ2085 - F/Sgt Johnson and Crew A/S Search 0640hrs to 1040hrs
Hudson NZ2045 - W/O Pat Mullooly and Crew A/S Search 0630hrs to 1031hrs
Hudson NZ2094 - F/O Whittall and Crew A/S Search 0627hrs to 1000hrs
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Post by Dave Homewood on May 31, 2019 23:54:56 GMT 12
No. 3 Squadron Operations Record Book 2 March 1944 RNZAF Station Ohakea
Anti Sub Search Cook Strair
Hudson NZ2085 A/S Search 0635hrs to 1043hrs - F/Lt Clarry Parker - Sgt Lennon - F/Sgt Watson - Sgt McKenzie This aircraft took off as strike and proceeded to posn 41.32S 147.47E conducting a search within ten miles radius of Datum. At 0504 hours a minesweeper dropped A.W. depth charges at a suspected enemy submarine but did not observe results. A/C search negative
Hudson NZ2073 A/S Search 0917hrs to 1410hrs - F/O Baird - F/Sgt Payne - F/Sgt Wakelin - W/O Tarrant This aircraft relieved I/3 and carried out search to radius of 20 miles but with the same results.
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Post by Dave Homewood on Jan 10, 2020 22:04:12 GMT 12
Here is an article about a submarine off our coast from the Evening Post dated 3rd of March 1944:
SUBMARINE OFF COAST
Attack On Rangatira
TORPEDO PASSES STERN
The presence of an enemy submarine off the New Zealand coast, which had resulted in the suspension of the inter-island ferry service on Wednesday and the closing of a number of ports, was the subject of a statement by the Prime Minister today.
Mr. Fraser said he was taking the step of publicly announcing this danger to let the people know the reason why the Wellington-Lyttelton, and and the Wellington-Picton steamers were not running and also as a warning against the dangers of travelling by sea at present. "Even if the Navy authorities consider that the boats can proceed without unreasonable risk," said Mr. Fraser, "intending passengers should understand that there can be no assurance of immunity from attack by a submarine, that there can be no guarantee of safety, and that they themselves voluntarily take the measure of risk involved.
TRIBUTE TO NAVY AUTHORITIES.
The Prime Minister added that he wished to pay warm tribute to the great promptitude and efficiency with which the Naval authorities had acted in this matter.
As a result of a warning of the probability that a submarine, might be off the coast, they had ensured that the inter-island ferry steamer Rangatira had taken all precautionary measures against the possibility of attack. That the need for these measures was well founded was proved by the fact that at about 2 a.m. on Wednesday the members of the gun drew had reported that a torpedo had passed the stem of the vessel.
From a very early hour on Wednesday morning the Navy and the Air Force, which also had risen to the occasion with great promptitude and efficiency, co-operated in patrols in search of the submarine.
One pilot had reported seeing a good distance out at sea a suspicious-looking object shaped like a submarine showing below the surface obviously submerging. Unfortunately, the bad weather of yesterday and today had interrupted the search which will, however, be continued to the fullest practicable extent.
"I would like to add," said Mr. Fraser, "that although the Pacific battle area has moved further from our shores, New Zealand is still in the war zone, and we may not continue to be as fortunate as we have been up to the present in avoiding attacks on our shipping with the consequent danger of serious loss of life."
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Post by Dave Homewood on Jul 31, 2020 12:39:53 GMT 12
JAP PLANE OVER THE CITY
An Episode Of 1942
FACTS FROM ENEMY RECORD
Before dawn on March 8, 1942, a Japanese submarine lay rolling sluggishly off the coast near Wellington. On her deck some of the crew anxiously listened for the beat of the engine of a tiny seaplane returning from a reconnaissance of the harbour and its shipping. For her task was not yet completed; five nights later she was to carry out another reconnaissance, this time over Auckland. Auckland was visited again later in May.
The battle of the Java Sea, so disastrous to Allied hopes, had just concluded. On the crest of the wave in the Netherlands East Indies, and poised to start their occupation of bases in the Solomons, the Japanese planned a strike at the Allied rear bases which would, perhaps, effectively cripple some of the major seagoing units which would be opposed to them, and at the same time supply vital information on naval dispositions. Perhaps the bait offered in Wellington and Auckland at the time was not sufficiently tempting; perhaps the difficulties were too great. Sydney harbour was eventually selected as the target for the midget submarine raid, with results the world already knows.
With the cessation of the war against Japan these details can now be given. But for the capture of enemy documents, in which the movements of submarines were tabulated in detail, no knowledge might even yet have come to hand of the flights carried out over this country, for confirmation has not been received from other sources. The first of the flights over New Zealand was carried out from a submarine fitted to carry and launch a tiny seaplane. She commenced her activities with a reconnaissance of Sydney at dawn on February 7, 1942. On February 26 Melbourne was observed, and on March 1 Hobart.
THROUGH COOK STRAIT. Before dawn on March 8 the seaplane was over Wellington. Then it apparently proceeded through Cook Strait and up the East Coast to carry out a pre-dawn reconnaissance of Auckland on March 13. The senior officer in command of the five parent submarines from which were launched the midgets which carried out the raid on Sydney Harbour was aboard another submarine, which carried out a reconnaissance over Suva, later approaching Auckland and sending its aircraft over the harbour on May 24. After this exploit it proceeded to Sydney, where a final reconnaissance was carried out at dawn on May 29.
MIDGETS ATTACK. Final plans had been made. On the night of May 31-June 1 the midgets attacked. One of the large submarines involved carried the senior officer (aircraft), a second was an aircraft-carrying boat, and three others carried the midgets which actually launched the attack.
Elsewhere at the time the Japanese were preparing to start the Midway operation. Hence, no doubt, the boat over here in May was endeavouring to collect information on Allied fleet dispositions. The Sydney raid was evidently designed as a diversion with the added hope of damaging Allied warships.
IT CAN HAPPEN HERE. These flights effectively shatter the fondly-treasured belief, held by many people, that the Japanese were not interested in New Zealand. They give the lie to the complacent attitude, so frequently adopted, of "It can't happen here." The submarines used by the Japanese for these operations were long-range cruiser-type boats for fleet operations and patrol, capable of refuelling and supplying short-range submarines. Certain units carry aircraft (collapsible float-planes) in hangars forward of the conning tower, capable of being launched from elevatable bow catapults.
EVENING POST, 18 AUGUST 1945
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