Post by Dave Homewood on Aug 13, 2020 23:13:01 GMT 12
"THE LAST LAP"
PACIFIC VICTORY
WORK OF THE FLEETS
O.C. AUCKLAND, This Day. A review of "the last lap" of the war against Japan, and some thoughts on the present situation in the Pacific, were given to members of the Auckland Rotary Club by Captain F. J. Butler, M.B.E., R.N., commanding officer of H.M.N.Z.S. Achilles. Captain Butler's address covered the period from June of this year until the surrender last month.
June, said Captain Butler, found the Allies facing Japan from Iwo Jima, which had been built up for use by striking forces of aircraft, from Guam, headquarters of the naval war, from the Okinawa group, from the major harbours of the Philippines, where San Pedro Gulf was the main base, and from the Admiralties, which were used as the advanced base of the British Pacific Fleet. San Pedro Gulf was exposed to typhoons, and the Admiralties were about 2500 miles from Tokio.
DEFENCE OF HOME ISLANDS
On the Japanese side, the enemy had been cleared from Burma and had been assaulted in Borneo, and he was also making a most interesting movement in China. This was a genuine strategical withdrawal. It was conducted as the Japanese wished and when they wished. They were not driven by force from airfields, ports, and land in general, but retired as they intended and in the manner they wanted, and had they wished to recapture any of these points they could have done so.
It was quite clear from the Japanese behaviour in June and July, Captain Butler said, that the whole of their strategy was being centred on the defence of the home islands. The information the Allies had showed that the enemy was making a general "build-up"' of strength in Korea, and the main islands. Outlying garrisons seemed to have been left behind more for the purpose of denying these points to the Allies than for their use by the Japanese.
"In June and July." Captain Butler continued, "the picture could not possibly suggest to anyone that in August the Japanese were going to surrender.
INVASION PROBABLE.
So far as the Allied naval forces were concerned, the Americans had a very strong fleet and the British, in the British Pacific Fleet, had an extremely useful one. Whether the intention was to invade Japan he could not say, but it was reasonable to assume that an invasion was hoped for before the end of the year. However, when the British Pacific Fleet ships left Manus in the Admiralties their task was put down as being to achieve the maximum attrition of the enemy air forces, shipping, and military power generally, and the maximum damage to factories, airfields, and railways.
The use of the word attrition in the orders did not suggest that the operations of the fleet would end with the Japanese surrender. Captain Butler described the various operations of the American Third Fleet, of which the British force was then a part, from July 15 until the Japanese collapsed. He surveyed the various air strikes made by the carriers against the northern end of Honshu, against the Tokio area, against Kyushu, and against shipping in the Inland Sea, and he remarked upon the extraordinarily little, airborne reaction shown by the Japanese. This was in spite of the fact that the Allies had been informed that about 4000 aircraft were concentrated in the Tokio area and several hundreds were in the northern Honshu area. However, the only reactions were completely uncoordinated.
SURRENDER UNEXPECTED.
After a storm had prevented the Achilles and the cruiser Newfoundland from making an anti-shipping sweep at the entrance to the Inland Sea, the fleet went back to Honshu. This return caught the Japanese off-guard. Airfields were covered with aircraft, but anti-aircraft guns were not manned. A number of destroyers and destroyer escorts were also hidden in bays along the coast, and there were suicide motor-boats and submarines. In his belief, Captain Butler said, the Japanese had moved their forces to northern Honshu in anticipation of an Allied invasion.
During this period the conviction had been growing in him that the Allied fleets, when controlled the sea right up to the shores of Japan, were giving the Japanese a tremendous hammering. But even in August it never entered the heads of the men there that the fleets were doing more than providing a preliminary to invasion. Even when the Japanese surrender offer was heard it was generally regarded as a test, and not something from which the ultimate surrender would come.
The situation was now peculiar. For the first time in history a country had surrendered before its armies had been defeated and shattered in the field. Instead of destroying the means to resist and from there going on to destroy the will to resist, the Allies had jumped over the enemy's ability to resist and finished his will to resist.
Could it be wondered, therefore, that the present position was difficult, when so many undefeated armies, in countries which they had conquered, were suddenly ordered to surrender. Moreover, the Allies had their difficulties. For instance, there was the shortage of shipping to occupy and supply the various countries and islands. As a result of these and other considerations, he did not think a hurried finish to the Pacific situation could be foreseen. The war was only half-won. Possibly only the easiest half was over. A big job still remained to be done, and all ships were wanted urgently for the tasks ahead. The Japanese were a peculiar race. A man could not be educated on Samurai or Bushido codes, and the effect of these codes could not be removed by signing a paper. Much, then still had to be done.
EVENING POST, 19 SEPTEMBER 1945
PACIFIC VICTORY
WORK OF THE FLEETS
O.C. AUCKLAND, This Day. A review of "the last lap" of the war against Japan, and some thoughts on the present situation in the Pacific, were given to members of the Auckland Rotary Club by Captain F. J. Butler, M.B.E., R.N., commanding officer of H.M.N.Z.S. Achilles. Captain Butler's address covered the period from June of this year until the surrender last month.
June, said Captain Butler, found the Allies facing Japan from Iwo Jima, which had been built up for use by striking forces of aircraft, from Guam, headquarters of the naval war, from the Okinawa group, from the major harbours of the Philippines, where San Pedro Gulf was the main base, and from the Admiralties, which were used as the advanced base of the British Pacific Fleet. San Pedro Gulf was exposed to typhoons, and the Admiralties were about 2500 miles from Tokio.
DEFENCE OF HOME ISLANDS
On the Japanese side, the enemy had been cleared from Burma and had been assaulted in Borneo, and he was also making a most interesting movement in China. This was a genuine strategical withdrawal. It was conducted as the Japanese wished and when they wished. They were not driven by force from airfields, ports, and land in general, but retired as they intended and in the manner they wanted, and had they wished to recapture any of these points they could have done so.
It was quite clear from the Japanese behaviour in June and July, Captain Butler said, that the whole of their strategy was being centred on the defence of the home islands. The information the Allies had showed that the enemy was making a general "build-up"' of strength in Korea, and the main islands. Outlying garrisons seemed to have been left behind more for the purpose of denying these points to the Allies than for their use by the Japanese.
"In June and July." Captain Butler continued, "the picture could not possibly suggest to anyone that in August the Japanese were going to surrender.
INVASION PROBABLE.
So far as the Allied naval forces were concerned, the Americans had a very strong fleet and the British, in the British Pacific Fleet, had an extremely useful one. Whether the intention was to invade Japan he could not say, but it was reasonable to assume that an invasion was hoped for before the end of the year. However, when the British Pacific Fleet ships left Manus in the Admiralties their task was put down as being to achieve the maximum attrition of the enemy air forces, shipping, and military power generally, and the maximum damage to factories, airfields, and railways.
The use of the word attrition in the orders did not suggest that the operations of the fleet would end with the Japanese surrender. Captain Butler described the various operations of the American Third Fleet, of which the British force was then a part, from July 15 until the Japanese collapsed. He surveyed the various air strikes made by the carriers against the northern end of Honshu, against the Tokio area, against Kyushu, and against shipping in the Inland Sea, and he remarked upon the extraordinarily little, airborne reaction shown by the Japanese. This was in spite of the fact that the Allies had been informed that about 4000 aircraft were concentrated in the Tokio area and several hundreds were in the northern Honshu area. However, the only reactions were completely uncoordinated.
SURRENDER UNEXPECTED.
After a storm had prevented the Achilles and the cruiser Newfoundland from making an anti-shipping sweep at the entrance to the Inland Sea, the fleet went back to Honshu. This return caught the Japanese off-guard. Airfields were covered with aircraft, but anti-aircraft guns were not manned. A number of destroyers and destroyer escorts were also hidden in bays along the coast, and there were suicide motor-boats and submarines. In his belief, Captain Butler said, the Japanese had moved their forces to northern Honshu in anticipation of an Allied invasion.
During this period the conviction had been growing in him that the Allied fleets, when controlled the sea right up to the shores of Japan, were giving the Japanese a tremendous hammering. But even in August it never entered the heads of the men there that the fleets were doing more than providing a preliminary to invasion. Even when the Japanese surrender offer was heard it was generally regarded as a test, and not something from which the ultimate surrender would come.
The situation was now peculiar. For the first time in history a country had surrendered before its armies had been defeated and shattered in the field. Instead of destroying the means to resist and from there going on to destroy the will to resist, the Allies had jumped over the enemy's ability to resist and finished his will to resist.
Could it be wondered, therefore, that the present position was difficult, when so many undefeated armies, in countries which they had conquered, were suddenly ordered to surrender. Moreover, the Allies had their difficulties. For instance, there was the shortage of shipping to occupy and supply the various countries and islands. As a result of these and other considerations, he did not think a hurried finish to the Pacific situation could be foreseen. The war was only half-won. Possibly only the easiest half was over. A big job still remained to be done, and all ships were wanted urgently for the tasks ahead. The Japanese were a peculiar race. A man could not be educated on Samurai or Bushido codes, and the effect of these codes could not be removed by signing a paper. Much, then still had to be done.
EVENING POST, 19 SEPTEMBER 1945
