Post by corsair67 on Sept 5, 2006 11:35:33 GMT 12
So it's taken the loss of nine lives for the Navy to work out there were some problems with their safety, training and maintenance standards in 817SQN.
Surely someone knew there were problems and could have done something to correct them before they led to a fatal accident?
This story is from AAP
Organisation blamed for Sea King crash
September 04, 2006.
THE Sea King accident that claimed nine lives in Indonesia last year was the result of organisational failings and no one person can be blamed, an inquiry into the tragedy has been told.
In closing submissions, Lieutenant Commander Caroline Needham said the crash was a “tragic organisational accident”.
Lt Cdr Needham told the Board of Inquiry into the tragedy that poor design, a lack of supervision and poor training all contributed to the accident in Indonesia on April 2 last year.
Nine Australian military personnel were killed when the Sea King helicopter crashed during an earthquake rescue mission on the Indonesian island of Nias.
“It is inappropriate and counter-productive to apportion blame to individuals who erred because of organisational deficiencies,” said Lt Cdr Needham, representing Leading Seaman Daniel Viero.
She said the conditions, including “poor design, gaps in supervision, undetected manufacturing deficiencies and the maintenance failures, unworkable procedures, shortfalls in training and less than adequate tools and equipment”, were present in Squadron 817 for years.
“Yet they remained uncorrected by middle or upper management,” she told the inquiry.
“The continual erosion of safety margins ended in catastrophe.”
Representing Able Seaman Mathew Jose, Lt Cdr Felicity Rogers said there was insufficient evidence to find that the accident was caused because of the absence of a split pin which caused the separation of a bell crank in the helicopter.
“That is a quantum leap ... and should be treated with caution,” Lt Cdr Rogers said.
Both counsel said their clients who were involved in the maintenance of the bell crank were too junior to take responsibility.
The inquiry also heard evidence today which could substantiate Lt Cdr Needham's claims of inadequate tools. In a re-enactment of the reinstallation of the fore/aft bell crank staged in May this year, Petty Officer Brad Graham said he could not find the appropriate tools.
With the same tool kit used by the maintainers who put the bell crank back into the Sea King before its crash, PO Graham also had to make his own judgment on the tension applied to the bolts which held the crank in place.
He said it was a frustrating job and took him two attempts to secure the split pins and bell crank by using two screwdrivers instead of the more appropriate crow foot spanner which he could not find.
PO Graham said in a real-life situation he would have referred the job to a superior officer.
The inquiry continues tomorrow.
Surely someone knew there were problems and could have done something to correct them before they led to a fatal accident?
This story is from AAP
Organisation blamed for Sea King crash
September 04, 2006.
THE Sea King accident that claimed nine lives in Indonesia last year was the result of organisational failings and no one person can be blamed, an inquiry into the tragedy has been told.
In closing submissions, Lieutenant Commander Caroline Needham said the crash was a “tragic organisational accident”.
Lt Cdr Needham told the Board of Inquiry into the tragedy that poor design, a lack of supervision and poor training all contributed to the accident in Indonesia on April 2 last year.
Nine Australian military personnel were killed when the Sea King helicopter crashed during an earthquake rescue mission on the Indonesian island of Nias.
“It is inappropriate and counter-productive to apportion blame to individuals who erred because of organisational deficiencies,” said Lt Cdr Needham, representing Leading Seaman Daniel Viero.
She said the conditions, including “poor design, gaps in supervision, undetected manufacturing deficiencies and the maintenance failures, unworkable procedures, shortfalls in training and less than adequate tools and equipment”, were present in Squadron 817 for years.
“Yet they remained uncorrected by middle or upper management,” she told the inquiry.
“The continual erosion of safety margins ended in catastrophe.”
Representing Able Seaman Mathew Jose, Lt Cdr Felicity Rogers said there was insufficient evidence to find that the accident was caused because of the absence of a split pin which caused the separation of a bell crank in the helicopter.
“That is a quantum leap ... and should be treated with caution,” Lt Cdr Rogers said.
Both counsel said their clients who were involved in the maintenance of the bell crank were too junior to take responsibility.
The inquiry also heard evidence today which could substantiate Lt Cdr Needham's claims of inadequate tools. In a re-enactment of the reinstallation of the fore/aft bell crank staged in May this year, Petty Officer Brad Graham said he could not find the appropriate tools.
With the same tool kit used by the maintainers who put the bell crank back into the Sea King before its crash, PO Graham also had to make his own judgment on the tension applied to the bolts which held the crank in place.
He said it was a frustrating job and took him two attempts to secure the split pins and bell crank by using two screwdrivers instead of the more appropriate crow foot spanner which he could not find.
PO Graham said in a real-life situation he would have referred the job to a superior officer.
The inquiry continues tomorrow.
