Post by flyjoe180 on Oct 31, 2007 13:12:02 GMT 12
This author claims the Air Ministry built the myth of the Battle of Britain to gain more resources. He also claims Fighter Command allowed the Luftwaffe to gain the upper hand in the weeks preceding the Battle.
Their skill and bravery in winning the Battle of Britain is legendary.
But many of the RAF's Spitfire and Hurricane pilots were actually so short on training they were unable to shoot straight, a historian has claimed.
Dr Anthony Cumming, writing in the latest edition of BBC History Magazine, says the pilots' role in the nation's "finest hour" was a myth deliberately built up by the Air Ministry to help its own battle for more resources.
Desperate shortages of pilots meant that barely-trained Spitfire and Hurricane crew were ordered into battle without ever having fired their guns, and unable to "shoot straight" due to "completely inadequate" gunnery training.
And despite the popular image of a dashing young RAF pilot painting another Swastika on his fighter's fuselage to mark his latest kill, barely one pilot in seven could actually claim credit for shooting down an enemy aircraft.
According to Dr Cumming, the Air Ministry "skilfully marketed" the legend that "a handful of brave fighter pilots" prevented a German invasion by denying the Luftwaffe control of the skies in the summer of 1940.
He argues that the image of the RAF Fighter Command as an "exemplar of efficiency" - with superb aircraft and highly effective pioneering radar systems defeating the Luftwaffe's superior numbers - does not bear scrutiny, despite being repeated by "countless television documentaries" since.
While acknowledging the bravery of the RAF's pilots, he claims the looming threat of the Royal Navy's warships was the real key to Hitler's decision to cancel his invasion plans, fearing they could wreak havoc on an invading German fleet.
Dr Cumming claims that Britain's Fighter Command allowed the Luftwaffe to gain "the upper hand" over the South Coast for several weeks, and was unable to stop hugely destructive bombing of British towns and cities at night.
An inadequate training programme meant many pilots were sent into battle with just ten hours of solo flying under their belts.
The RAF's two top aces during the Battle of Britain, Sergeant J Frantisek and Flying Officer Witold Urbanowicz, were trained in foreign air forces, he points out.
Britain's "primitive" radar systems were not as effective as was claimed at the time, but the subject of "exaggerated" accounts designed to gain more funding from Churchill's Government, claims Dr Cumming.
The Spitfire and Hurricane fighters were "adequate" for their task, but their machine guns were "poor tools" for shooting down German bombers, he says.
Dr Cumming's arguments drew criticism from other commentators last night.
Military historian Correlli Barnett dismissed his arguments as "clever but silly", saying:
"This betrays a lack of understanding of the reality of combat, and what makes a victory or defeat. It's well known that the RAF faced a critical lack of trained pilots. That happens in a battle of attrition.
"Britain's radar was primitive, yes, but it gave far better advance warning of German raids than we would have had without it.
"You could measure any military force against some ideal standard and find them wanting, but that's meaningless.
"What made Britain's air defences in 1940 so strong was that they brought together all the elements - radar, observers on the ground, plotters and commanders in the operational HQ and, of course, the aircraft and pilots.
"In the final analysis who won the battle? The Luftwaffe suffered twice as many losses as the RAF and could not sustain them. Fighter Command did just enough to win."
Their skill and bravery in winning the Battle of Britain is legendary.
But many of the RAF's Spitfire and Hurricane pilots were actually so short on training they were unable to shoot straight, a historian has claimed.
Dr Anthony Cumming, writing in the latest edition of BBC History Magazine, says the pilots' role in the nation's "finest hour" was a myth deliberately built up by the Air Ministry to help its own battle for more resources.
Desperate shortages of pilots meant that barely-trained Spitfire and Hurricane crew were ordered into battle without ever having fired their guns, and unable to "shoot straight" due to "completely inadequate" gunnery training.
And despite the popular image of a dashing young RAF pilot painting another Swastika on his fighter's fuselage to mark his latest kill, barely one pilot in seven could actually claim credit for shooting down an enemy aircraft.
According to Dr Cumming, the Air Ministry "skilfully marketed" the legend that "a handful of brave fighter pilots" prevented a German invasion by denying the Luftwaffe control of the skies in the summer of 1940.
He argues that the image of the RAF Fighter Command as an "exemplar of efficiency" - with superb aircraft and highly effective pioneering radar systems defeating the Luftwaffe's superior numbers - does not bear scrutiny, despite being repeated by "countless television documentaries" since.
While acknowledging the bravery of the RAF's pilots, he claims the looming threat of the Royal Navy's warships was the real key to Hitler's decision to cancel his invasion plans, fearing they could wreak havoc on an invading German fleet.
Dr Cumming claims that Britain's Fighter Command allowed the Luftwaffe to gain "the upper hand" over the South Coast for several weeks, and was unable to stop hugely destructive bombing of British towns and cities at night.
An inadequate training programme meant many pilots were sent into battle with just ten hours of solo flying under their belts.
The RAF's two top aces during the Battle of Britain, Sergeant J Frantisek and Flying Officer Witold Urbanowicz, were trained in foreign air forces, he points out.
Britain's "primitive" radar systems were not as effective as was claimed at the time, but the subject of "exaggerated" accounts designed to gain more funding from Churchill's Government, claims Dr Cumming.
The Spitfire and Hurricane fighters were "adequate" for their task, but their machine guns were "poor tools" for shooting down German bombers, he says.
Dr Cumming's arguments drew criticism from other commentators last night.
Military historian Correlli Barnett dismissed his arguments as "clever but silly", saying:
"This betrays a lack of understanding of the reality of combat, and what makes a victory or defeat. It's well known that the RAF faced a critical lack of trained pilots. That happens in a battle of attrition.
"Britain's radar was primitive, yes, but it gave far better advance warning of German raids than we would have had without it.
"You could measure any military force against some ideal standard and find them wanting, but that's meaningless.
"What made Britain's air defences in 1940 so strong was that they brought together all the elements - radar, observers on the ground, plotters and commanders in the operational HQ and, of course, the aircraft and pilots.
"In the final analysis who won the battle? The Luftwaffe suffered twice as many losses as the RAF and could not sustain them. Fighter Command did just enough to win."
