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Post by kb on Sept 4, 2012 17:44:29 GMT 12
Phil82 wrote
"I spent a late honeymoon on Norfolk, 1971, when the only means of getting there was a single Qantas DC4 maintained only for that route! Here it is! B747 can land at Wellington, but can't operate at normal weights so they didn't. They were required to land one there at least once a year, which usually attracted a crowd."
I have photos somewhere of that DC-4. It seemed forever on takeoff at Mangere. When I get myself sorted I will dig it out and post.
Qantas B747's did regularly land at Wellington. They were the SP version! My mate lived in the hills above and sometimes they seemed barely higher than us watching.
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Post by kb on Jul 19, 2012 19:04:14 GMT 12
I haven't been logged in much lately so it seems I have missed a bit. I should be able to put up two, possibly three and take them to Ardmore for the airshow and to Don's. Can you book me into the latter please Dave.
Also, I am willing to pay for a vet's dinner if you haven't arranged anything Dave.
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Post by kb on Jun 7, 2012 12:26:20 GMT 12
Air-Sea Battle: Clearing the Fog The goal is to ensure all forces can get to the fight
By Capt. Philip DuPree, USN and Col. Jordan Thomas, USAF
Recent articles about Air-Sea Battle reflect misperceptions about this new operational concept. These may have been fostered by the fact that portions of the concept document are classified. In any event, we -- the service leads in the multiservice ASB office -- would like to correct them.
Let us say at the outset what Air-Sea Battle is not. It is not a strategy, it is not designed to threaten other nations. and it is not just the manifestation of traditional joint operations.
Perhaps the most troubling misperception is that ASB is only about air and naval forces, that it ignores the land component. To the contrary: It is an operating concept that seeks to assure, in the face of rising technological challenges, that all components of U.S. and allied forces can be brought to bear as deemed necessary.
In 2009, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates directed the departments of the Navy and the Air Force to develop a concept to counter emerging anti-access/area-denial challenges, known as A2/AD. Last year, the departments responded to Gates' directive with the Air-Sea Battle concept. In October, Gates' successor, Leon Panetta, formally endorsed the effort.
It should be noted that ASB is one of several supporting concepts nested under the Joint Operational Access Concept approved by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both concepts will be complemented by the Joint Concept for Entry Operations, now in early development, which will be more primarily concerned with land forces.
THE A2/AD OUTLOOK
We can define anti-access capabilities as ones that slow deployment of friendly forces into a theater, prevent them from operating from certain locations within that theater or cause them to operate over longer distances than they would like. Area-denial efforts are those that reduce friendly forces' freedom of action in the more narrow confines of the area under the enemy's direct control.
Such problems are not new. During World War II, for example, Imperial Japan possessed robust A2/AD capabilities in the form of air forces, surface fleets, submarine forces, naval minelayers, and air defenses. All had to be overcome by U.S. and Allied air and naval forces to make effective power projection possible.
More recent adversaries have been largely unable to mount anti-access capabilities. During our operations over the last 20 years in the Middle East and Central Asia, our air superiority and sea control were not challenged in any meaningful way outside of adversaries' national airspace and littoral waters.
In the future, we are less likely to be so fortunate. Several decades of U.S. dominance have not blinded potential enemies to the value of A2/AD concepts. The ability to strike at incoming forces far beyond a nation's borders promises a powerful asymmetric challenge to the U.S. military, which since the Cold War has developed the means and the methods "to rapidly deliver combat power whenever and wherever U.S. strategy required," as Gen. Norton Schwartz and Adm. Jon Greenert wrote in a recent article. "Potential adversaries were clearly mindful of this transformation," the chief of staff of the Air Force and the chief of naval operations wrote in "Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty" (The American Interest, Feb. 20). "They observed the inability of Soviet-era doctrine and weapons to blunt American power and reconsidered their approach to resisting U.S. military intervention. Competitors with the will and means gradually shifted from planning to fight American forces when they arrived and instead focused on denying U.S. access to the theater."
The emergence of A2/AD as a major concern is due to the proliferation of technology that places precise, long-range fires in the hands of potential foes. Such weapons include ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated air defense systems, anti-ship missiles, submarines, guided rockets, missiles and artillery, 4th- and 5th-generation combat aircraft -- even space and cyberwarfare capabilities.
If left unchecked, these could allow adversaries to challenge joint and coalition forces in the global commons: those areas of air, sea, space, and cyberspace shared by all nations and used for commerce, transportation, communication, and trade. Since credible U.S. power projection is a fundamental pillar of regional stability, even the perception of a slipping ability to gain access to the global commons without resorting to the threat of invasion or other escalation is a sign of strategic weakness that can lead to regional instability.
A "Pre-Integrated" Joint Force
For decades, the primary asymmetrical advantage underwriting U.S. and allied power projection has been superior technology and the commensurate development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs. When adversaries can counter U.S. advantages with their own asymmetric capabilities, our best response lies in better integration and more flexible capabilities.
Accordingly, the central idea of ASB is an unprecedented level of joint integration leading to air and naval forces that can launch networked, integrated attacks-in-depth to disrupt, destroy, and defeat an adversary's A2/AD capabilities.
At its core, ASB seeks a "pre-integrated" joint force that possesses habitual relationships, interoperable and complementary cross-domain capabilities, and realistic, shared training, while retaining the flexibility to develop new TTPs on the fly. Such forces will provide the strategic deterrence, assurance, and stabilizing effects of a "force in being" and will also be operationally useful at the outset of hostilities, without delays for buildups and extensive mission rehearsal. Moreover, they will ensure that a joint force commander has a full range of options when facing an adversary with an A2/AD capability.
Another way to put this is that ASB seeks to preserve U.S. and allied air-sea-space superiority. It is this level of domain control that unlocks a land force's deterrent and war-fighting potential. If air and naval forces cannot establish control of the air, space, cyberspace, and maritime environments or if they cannot sustain deployed forces, no operational concept is tenable. If ground forces cannot get to the fight or be sustained in an advanced A2/AD environment, they will fail to serve the vital interests of America, our allies, and the international system.
We may have developed a blind spot to this perennial truth, mainly because U.S. and allied forces have enjoyed uncontested freedom of action in the air, sea, and space domains for more than a generation. Some who write about conflict in contested areas seem to assume future adversaries will not effectively oppose deployment and sustainment of ground, air, or naval forces. That has been largely true over the past two decades, but will not be guaranteed in the future. Against advanced adversaries, freedom of action cannot be taken for granted.
A FUTURE WITHOUT ASB?
Perhaps the best way to understand the value of the ASB concept is to imagine a future where its integrated air and naval capabilities and capacity do not exist.
In such a future, attempts to use the familiar expeditionary model of massing combat power -- the so-called "iron mountain" -- at a handful of main operating bases to conduct extensive mission rehearsal and subsequently seize the initiative at a time and place of the Joint Force commander's choosing, may not be feasible. Advanced adversaries could deny secure U.S. land basing at very long ranges, preventing air and naval forces from gaining local air superiority. Sea basing could also be challenged and attempts at ad hoc integration may be insufficient. Enemy capabilities could prevent surface action groups from operating at effective ranges and sea control may therefore be untenable. Space and cyberspace access would not be assured, and global communications and the exchange of information could be held hostage by any motivated aggressor.
Without freedom of action in the air, sea, and space provided by integrated air and naval forces, aggressive nations with proliferated A2/AD capabilities could restrict or close off international airspace and vital sea lanes at will. Joint forces attempting to undo such aggression would face robust area denial threats and be required to operate in a heavily-contested environment.
Lacking the networked, integrated force required to prevail in such conditions, U.S. and allied forces may not be able to prevent the undermining of the interconnected international systems of finance, trade, security and law enabled by access to the global commons. The loss of a secure global commons could weaken alliances, partnerships, and the rule of law and could force other nations to accommodate regional hegemons and make the world permanently less free. In this future, it would not matter how capable any ground assault forces are because, without freedom of action in the global commons, the joint force could not credibly deploy and sustain them.
A BETTER FUTURE
Air-Sea Battle seeks a better future -- one that employs teamwork between air and naval forces to maintain U.S. superiority in the air, space, and cyberspace, and at sea, at an acceptable cost, allowing the joint force to shape future A2/AD environments, deter other nations from threatening the global commons, and use all service and joint competencies to defeat a capable A2/AD adversary when necessary.
Though it is meant to facilitate all courses of action, the concept itself is not provocative. Instead, it is designed to produce forces that are more likely to have a stabilizing effect, making a major war less likely. ASB air and naval forces will allow the U.S. and its allies to avoid relying on more escalatory capabilities that existentially threaten another nation or its leadership (e.g. nuclear escalation or threat of invasion), or involve alternatives that are inherently defensive and less likely to deter adventurism and regional coercion (e.g. ceding the commons and relying on blockades and offensive mining).
In some cases, the commander might use such air and naval forces to deter potential adversaries; assure allies, friends, and partners; and keep the global commons open and accessible to all. In other situations, he or she may need to use the freedom of action provided through ASB for strike operations, forcible entry, or other methods of power projection.
Development of forces with this level of integration and capability will require years of effort and significant institutional change. This change has begun in the departments of the Navy and Air Force; the CNO and CSAF have written: "The Air-Sea Battle operational concept will guide our efforts to train and prepare air and naval forces for combat. We already train together and share joint doctrine. Under Air-Sea Battle, we will take 'jointness' to a new level, working together to establish more integrated exercises against more realistic threats."
In an ever-changing world that demands continued U.S. leadership, concepts like Air-Sea Battle are essential to sustaining America's military freedom of action and ability to project power.
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Post by kb on May 13, 2012 19:57:24 GMT 12
I have been tidying up and rediscovered these old videos. I was going to copy them to DVD but have encountered problems. If anyone is good at doing these transfers for me they can keep a copy and if there is any interest I will sell further copies for a minimal amount to cover my costs and a bit of my time. Wings on the Waitemata, Flying the Coast (West Coast), Wanaka Airshow 1996, Tigers to Turbines (Top Dressing), Kiwi Red and The Final Flight (SAFE). War Years, the Story of New Zealanders at War and Black Knights (RAAF Catalinas). I need to give up work to sort out all my stuff!
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Post by kb on May 3, 2012 13:10:33 GMT 12
Surprisingly for such a small airline which only operated for a few years there have been two books published on it. The other is "British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines 1946-1954". This book has as its main focus an aerophilatelic history of thr airline.
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Post by kb on May 1, 2012 10:30:58 GMT 12
According to my notes "scrapped early 1950s" so I would say not. Not sure of that Peter. I took a photo of it with my Box Brownie and I don't think I got that until 1955. Not absolutely sure about that either though but it must have been close!
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Post by kb on Apr 26, 2012 7:49:23 GMT 12
Dave the aeroplane we kept seeing was an Il-2 Shturmovic ground attack aircraft the most produced military aircraft with over 42,000 built including variants.
As this was just an ordinary person whose interest in his ancestor culminated in an absorbing documentary minor captioning etc didn't worry me at all. Also as a people person I enjoyed the local touches such as railway stations. And as you say some very interesting photos some of which I had not previously seen. A very interesting documentary!
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Post by kb on Apr 20, 2012 19:34:38 GMT 12
Sounds like the Kiwis have done a great job on our OZ Cussies in passing information to the museum. Perhaps the fact that our Bros were still flying them in combat long after we had Corsairs may have influenced the museums thinking that only early war counted but it its a bit sad for the RAAF coz they flew them in combat right into 1945. Poor so and so's.; Damn. I forgot about the League Test tonight. But, we might win! ;D ;D ;D
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Post by kb on Apr 19, 2012 8:06:24 GMT 12
$10 bucks says after the repairs she gets painted in U.S colors (yank spelt on purpose) Don't think so Gunny. My understanding is that the owner wanted it in it's proper markings. Great!
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Post by kb on Apr 13, 2012 15:05:44 GMT 12
While it is inacurate I can see why the term has been used. The squadron was there essentially to keep the peace and whats more its a great story.
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Post by kb on Apr 13, 2012 12:44:21 GMT 12
I received 4 copies of Jenny Scott's book this morning. First impressions are very favourable. When I commented on a previous book and said it was high quality I think some people thought I was commenting on the contents rather than the physical book so this time I will be more careful. Hard cover and very well bound. 254 pages. The paper is matt and of medium quality.
The book appears to be a comprehensive history of 6 Squadron 1943 - 1945 starting with a list of 29 log books and other archives, a list of those killed on active service, a list of Dumbo Missions, correspondence relating to the establishment of the squadron followed by a comprensive day by day diary starting on Sunday 2 May 1943. The latter is interspersed with personal memoirs. There are lots of photos largely of a personal nature but including a shot of NZ4021, XX-X being hoisted aboard the U.S.S. Chandeleur which I may have seen before but never the less very interesting.
The Dumbo Mission detail is quite comprehensive giving Date, Captain, Type, Position and No saved which totalled 79.
After a quick skim in my lunch break I can't offer any more information except to say that it appears to be a priceless addition to RNZAF history.
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Post by kb on Apr 8, 2012 11:27:59 GMT 12
I have just discovered this pearler! A compilation of British Movietown News coverage of the Empire Boats with sound. Unfortunately no TEAL but brief coverage of the Golden Hind and Sikorsky S.42. The site has an interesting history of a pre war, wartime and post war radio operator. Scroll down to coverage of the Shorts Boats. rsne.com.au/af/planes.htm#dh86
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Post by kb on Apr 4, 2012 17:26:36 GMT 12
Zac, Special Hobby have issued a 1/72 scale Buffalo with 488 Sqdn markings. Kit 72131.
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Post by kb on Mar 22, 2012 15:22:28 GMT 12
Whitcoulls have a special on at the moment for all books. Buy three books and get a 30% discount plus you also get another fiver off each book using the book coupons which the sales person will give you if you ask. If you only want the one book team up! [/quote] And take the opportunity to have a look at "In the Heavens Above" while you are there. I am amazed that my original post on what appears to be a superb book on RNZAF history did not elicit one reply!
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Post by kb on Mar 22, 2012 15:16:19 GMT 12
Think I might just wait till the price drops a bit more. There's a recession on ya know. Whitcoulls have a special on at the moment for all books. Buy three books and get a 30% discount plus you also get another fiver off each book using the book coupons which the sales person will give you if you ask. If you only want the one book team up!
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Post by kb on Mar 15, 2012 20:39:22 GMT 12
[quote In Australia (thankfully) there is no law that says where you have to wear descendants medals. You can wear them anywhere/way you want. And if anyone tells you different, then tell them to stick it. I think it’s ridiculous that NZ have a law (decree?) for where you can wear descendants decorations. There are always outstanding exceptions. Take the four Bradford boys in WW1 in the order in which they died. Lieutenant James Bradford MC Died of wounds 1917. Brigadier General Roland Bradford VC, MC, MiD Twice. Roland Bradford was an outstanding leader who during the war rose from Lieutenant to Brigadier General before being killed in action in 1917. I believe that at the time he was the youngest person to achieve that rank. Lt. Commander George Bradford VC. MiD. Killed in action at Zeebrugge 1918 and awarded his VC posthumously. Major Thomas Bradford DSO, MiD Twice. Thomas survived the war but was taken out of the front line before the end of the war probably because of what had happened to his brothers. So what is all this about you are thinking. Well the boys mother was a widow who suffered a major break down as a result of losing three of her four sons. About the only time she appeared in public after that was at every Remembrance Day in Folkestone wearing her sons medals. Who is there to tell someone like her where to wear them?
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Post by kb on Mar 12, 2012 17:48:15 GMT 12
This book is in the shops. It is a mighty tome, hardback with 647 pages and is priced accordingly @ RRP $84.99.
The sub titles explain the book's subject. British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, RNZAF Aircrew Training Canada 1940-1945.
I think the authors Ivan & Lorna Lindsey have done us a great service in compiling a history of this part of New Zealand aviation. I am impressed that in association with Wilsonscott Publishing they have achieved publication of such an expensive book dealing with a subject which will only appeal to a small number of enthusiasts and families whose fathers etc were associated with the scheme.
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Post by kb on Mar 7, 2012 12:23:04 GMT 12
Heads Up! Whitcoulls have the book which appears to have an RRP of $55.00. They are selling at $49.99. Also they are having a book week and you can ask them for or get from the Weekend Herald, a discount voucher for $5.00. So I paid $44.99 this morning.
I can't report on the content yet but it is physically a high quality book and the text appears to be aimed at historical aspects rather than one for the masses. The photos have a nice balance between aircraft, people and places and I would therefore give careful consideration to purchase if aircraft photos were my primary interest.
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Post by kb on Feb 2, 2012 15:05:02 GMT 12
Peter Donkin WAS low level RAF WW2 fighter reconnaissance. He commanded 35 Wing for much of it's existence. I haven't come across much about those operations except for an excellent book "Great Interruption" by Laurence Irving a well known artist and designer for the theatre. More importantly from our point of view he was a RNAS pilot in WW1 and had a very interesting WW2 including a long time with 35 Wing as their intelligence officer. His book is dedicated to Pete Donkin and one other officer.
As a matter of interest Donkin was shot down over the channel and was given up for lost and replaced as the C.O. of 35 Wing but turned up after 6 days afloat and resumed his command.
I am sure that he only flew Allison engined Mustangs which were unsurpassed for low level work. There is always the implication that the Mustang was hopeless until it received the Merlin. Not so, it was probably the best around at low level. I think Donkin may have flown Typhoons for a short time, he was certainly current in them when he was promoted to Air Commodore.
Thanks for the profile of Derrick Westenra's Mustang nuuumannn.
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