Post by kb on Jun 7, 2012 12:26:20 GMT 12
Air-Sea Battle: Clearing the Fog
The goal is to ensure all forces can get to the fight
By Capt. Philip DuPree, USN and Col. Jordan Thomas, USAF
Recent articles about Air-Sea Battle reflect misperceptions about this new
operational concept. These may have been fostered by the fact that portions
of the concept document are classified. In any event, we -- the service
leads in the multiservice ASB office -- would like to correct them.
Let us say at the outset what Air-Sea Battle is not. It is not a strategy,
it is not designed to threaten other nations. and it is not just the
manifestation of traditional joint operations.
Perhaps the most troubling misperception is that ASB is only about air and
naval forces, that it ignores the land component. To the contrary: It is an
operating concept that seeks to assure, in the face of rising technological
challenges, that all components of U.S. and allied forces can be brought to
bear as deemed necessary.
In 2009, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates directed the departments of
the Navy and the Air Force to develop a concept to counter emerging
anti-access/area-denial challenges, known as A2/AD. Last year, the
departments responded to Gates' directive with the Air-Sea Battle concept.
In October, Gates' successor, Leon Panetta, formally endorsed the effort.
It should be noted that ASB is one of several supporting concepts nested
under the Joint Operational Access Concept approved by the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both concepts will be complemented by the Joint
Concept for Entry Operations, now in early development, which will be more
primarily concerned with land forces.
THE A2/AD OUTLOOK
We can define anti-access capabilities as ones that slow deployment of
friendly forces into a theater, prevent them from operating from certain
locations within that theater or cause them to operate over longer distances
than they would like. Area-denial efforts are those that reduce friendly
forces' freedom of action in the more narrow confines of the area under the
enemy's direct control.
Such problems are not new. During World War II, for example, Imperial Japan
possessed robust A2/AD capabilities in the form of air forces, surface
fleets, submarine forces, naval minelayers, and air defenses. All had to be
overcome by U.S. and Allied air and naval forces to make effective power
projection possible.
More recent adversaries have been largely unable to mount anti-access
capabilities. During our operations over the last 20 years in the Middle
East and Central Asia, our air superiority and sea control were not
challenged in any meaningful way outside of adversaries' national airspace
and littoral waters.
In the future, we are less likely to be so fortunate. Several decades of
U.S. dominance have not blinded potential enemies to the value of A2/AD
concepts. The ability to strike at incoming forces far beyond a nation's
borders promises a powerful asymmetric challenge to the U.S. military, which
since the Cold War has developed the means and the methods "to rapidly
deliver combat power whenever and wherever U.S. strategy required," as Gen.
Norton Schwartz and Adm. Jon Greenert wrote in a recent article. "Potential
adversaries were clearly mindful of this transformation," the chief of staff
of the Air Force and the chief of naval operations wrote in "Air-Sea Battle:
Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty" (The American Interest, Feb.
20). "They observed the inability of Soviet-era doctrine and weapons to
blunt American power and reconsidered their approach to resisting U.S.
military intervention. Competitors with the will and means gradually shifted
from planning to fight American forces when they arrived and instead focused
on denying U.S. access to the theater."
The emergence of A2/AD as a major concern is due to the proliferation of
technology that places precise, long-range fires in the hands of potential
foes. Such weapons include ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated air
defense systems, anti-ship missiles, submarines, guided rockets, missiles
and artillery, 4th- and 5th-generation combat aircraft -- even space and
cyberwarfare capabilities.
If left unchecked, these could allow adversaries to challenge joint and
coalition forces in the global commons: those areas of air, sea, space, and
cyberspace shared by all nations and used for commerce, transportation,
communication, and trade. Since credible U.S. power projection is a
fundamental pillar of regional stability, even the perception of a slipping
ability to gain access to the global commons without resorting to the threat
of invasion or other escalation is a sign of strategic weakness that can
lead to regional instability.
A "Pre-Integrated" Joint Force
For decades, the primary asymmetrical advantage underwriting U.S. and allied
power projection has been superior technology and the commensurate
development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs. When
adversaries can counter U.S. advantages with their own asymmetric
capabilities, our best response lies in better integration and more flexible
capabilities.
Accordingly, the central idea of ASB is an unprecedented level of joint
integration leading to air and naval forces that can launch networked,
integrated attacks-in-depth to disrupt, destroy, and defeat an adversary's
A2/AD capabilities.
At its core, ASB seeks a "pre-integrated" joint force that possesses
habitual relationships, interoperable and complementary cross-domain
capabilities, and realistic, shared training, while retaining the
flexibility to develop new TTPs on the fly. Such forces will provide the
strategic deterrence, assurance, and stabilizing effects of a "force in
being" and will also be operationally useful at the outset of hostilities,
without delays for buildups and extensive mission rehearsal. Moreover, they
will ensure that a joint force commander has a full range of options when
facing an adversary with an A2/AD capability.
Another way to put this is that ASB seeks to preserve U.S. and allied
air-sea-space superiority. It is this level of domain control that unlocks a
land force's deterrent and war-fighting potential. If air and naval forces
cannot establish control of the air, space, cyberspace, and maritime
environments or if they cannot sustain deployed forces, no operational
concept is tenable. If ground forces cannot get to the fight or be sustained
in an advanced A2/AD environment, they will fail to serve the vital
interests of America, our allies, and the international system.
We may have developed a blind spot to this perennial truth, mainly because
U.S. and allied forces have enjoyed uncontested freedom of action in the
air, sea, and space domains for more than a generation. Some who write about
conflict in contested areas seem to assume future adversaries will not
effectively oppose deployment and sustainment of ground, air, or naval
forces. That has been largely true over the past two decades, but will not
be guaranteed in the future. Against advanced adversaries, freedom of action
cannot be taken for granted.
A FUTURE WITHOUT ASB?
Perhaps the best way to understand the value of the ASB concept is to
imagine a future where its integrated air and naval capabilities and
capacity do not exist.
In such a future, attempts to use the familiar expeditionary model of
massing combat power -- the so-called "iron mountain" -- at a handful of
main operating bases to conduct extensive mission rehearsal and subsequently
seize the initiative at a time and place of the Joint Force commander's
choosing, may not be feasible. Advanced adversaries could deny secure U.S.
land basing at very long ranges, preventing air and naval forces from
gaining local air superiority. Sea basing could also be challenged and
attempts at ad hoc integration may be insufficient. Enemy capabilities could
prevent surface action groups from operating at effective ranges and sea
control may therefore be untenable. Space and cyberspace access would not be
assured, and global communications and the exchange of information could be
held hostage by any motivated aggressor.
Without freedom of action in the air, sea, and space provided by integrated
air and naval forces, aggressive nations with proliferated A2/AD
capabilities could restrict or close off international airspace and vital
sea lanes at will. Joint forces attempting to undo such aggression would
face robust area denial threats and be required to operate in a
heavily-contested environment.
Lacking the networked, integrated force required to prevail in such
conditions, U.S. and allied forces may not be able to prevent the
undermining of the interconnected international systems of finance, trade,
security and law enabled by access to the global commons. The loss of a
secure global commons could weaken alliances, partnerships, and the rule of
law and could force other nations to accommodate regional hegemons and make
the world permanently less free. In this future, it would not matter how
capable any ground assault forces are because, without freedom of action in
the global commons, the joint force could not credibly deploy and sustain
them.
A BETTER FUTURE
Air-Sea Battle seeks a better future -- one that employs teamwork between
air and naval forces to maintain U.S. superiority in the air, space, and
cyberspace, and at sea, at an acceptable cost, allowing the joint force to
shape future A2/AD environments, deter other nations from threatening the
global commons, and use all service and joint competencies to defeat a
capable A2/AD adversary when necessary.
Though it is meant to facilitate all courses of action, the concept itself
is not provocative. Instead, it is designed to produce forces that are more
likely to have a stabilizing effect, making a major war less likely. ASB air
and naval forces will allow the U.S. and its allies to avoid relying on more
escalatory capabilities that existentially threaten another nation or its
leadership (e.g. nuclear escalation or threat of invasion), or involve
alternatives that are inherently defensive and less likely to deter
adventurism and regional coercion (e.g. ceding the commons and relying on
blockades and offensive mining).
In some cases, the commander might use such air and naval forces to deter
potential adversaries; assure allies, friends, and partners; and keep the
global commons open and accessible to all. In other situations, he or she
may need to use the freedom of action provided through ASB for strike
operations, forcible entry, or other methods of power projection.
Development of forces with this level of integration and capability will
require years of effort and significant institutional change. This change
has begun in the departments of the Navy and Air Force; the CNO and CSAF
have written: "The Air-Sea Battle operational concept will guide our efforts
to train and prepare air and naval forces for combat. We already train
together and share joint doctrine. Under Air-Sea Battle, we will take
'jointness' to a new level, working together to establish more integrated
exercises against more realistic threats."
In an ever-changing world that demands continued U.S. leadership, concepts
like Air-Sea Battle are essential to sustaining America's military freedom
of action and ability to project power.
The goal is to ensure all forces can get to the fight
By Capt. Philip DuPree, USN and Col. Jordan Thomas, USAF
Recent articles about Air-Sea Battle reflect misperceptions about this new
operational concept. These may have been fostered by the fact that portions
of the concept document are classified. In any event, we -- the service
leads in the multiservice ASB office -- would like to correct them.
Let us say at the outset what Air-Sea Battle is not. It is not a strategy,
it is not designed to threaten other nations. and it is not just the
manifestation of traditional joint operations.
Perhaps the most troubling misperception is that ASB is only about air and
naval forces, that it ignores the land component. To the contrary: It is an
operating concept that seeks to assure, in the face of rising technological
challenges, that all components of U.S. and allied forces can be brought to
bear as deemed necessary.
In 2009, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates directed the departments of
the Navy and the Air Force to develop a concept to counter emerging
anti-access/area-denial challenges, known as A2/AD. Last year, the
departments responded to Gates' directive with the Air-Sea Battle concept.
In October, Gates' successor, Leon Panetta, formally endorsed the effort.
It should be noted that ASB is one of several supporting concepts nested
under the Joint Operational Access Concept approved by the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both concepts will be complemented by the Joint
Concept for Entry Operations, now in early development, which will be more
primarily concerned with land forces.
THE A2/AD OUTLOOK
We can define anti-access capabilities as ones that slow deployment of
friendly forces into a theater, prevent them from operating from certain
locations within that theater or cause them to operate over longer distances
than they would like. Area-denial efforts are those that reduce friendly
forces' freedom of action in the more narrow confines of the area under the
enemy's direct control.
Such problems are not new. During World War II, for example, Imperial Japan
possessed robust A2/AD capabilities in the form of air forces, surface
fleets, submarine forces, naval minelayers, and air defenses. All had to be
overcome by U.S. and Allied air and naval forces to make effective power
projection possible.
More recent adversaries have been largely unable to mount anti-access
capabilities. During our operations over the last 20 years in the Middle
East and Central Asia, our air superiority and sea control were not
challenged in any meaningful way outside of adversaries' national airspace
and littoral waters.
In the future, we are less likely to be so fortunate. Several decades of
U.S. dominance have not blinded potential enemies to the value of A2/AD
concepts. The ability to strike at incoming forces far beyond a nation's
borders promises a powerful asymmetric challenge to the U.S. military, which
since the Cold War has developed the means and the methods "to rapidly
deliver combat power whenever and wherever U.S. strategy required," as Gen.
Norton Schwartz and Adm. Jon Greenert wrote in a recent article. "Potential
adversaries were clearly mindful of this transformation," the chief of staff
of the Air Force and the chief of naval operations wrote in "Air-Sea Battle:
Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty" (The American Interest, Feb.
20). "They observed the inability of Soviet-era doctrine and weapons to
blunt American power and reconsidered their approach to resisting U.S.
military intervention. Competitors with the will and means gradually shifted
from planning to fight American forces when they arrived and instead focused
on denying U.S. access to the theater."
The emergence of A2/AD as a major concern is due to the proliferation of
technology that places precise, long-range fires in the hands of potential
foes. Such weapons include ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated air
defense systems, anti-ship missiles, submarines, guided rockets, missiles
and artillery, 4th- and 5th-generation combat aircraft -- even space and
cyberwarfare capabilities.
If left unchecked, these could allow adversaries to challenge joint and
coalition forces in the global commons: those areas of air, sea, space, and
cyberspace shared by all nations and used for commerce, transportation,
communication, and trade. Since credible U.S. power projection is a
fundamental pillar of regional stability, even the perception of a slipping
ability to gain access to the global commons without resorting to the threat
of invasion or other escalation is a sign of strategic weakness that can
lead to regional instability.
A "Pre-Integrated" Joint Force
For decades, the primary asymmetrical advantage underwriting U.S. and allied
power projection has been superior technology and the commensurate
development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs. When
adversaries can counter U.S. advantages with their own asymmetric
capabilities, our best response lies in better integration and more flexible
capabilities.
Accordingly, the central idea of ASB is an unprecedented level of joint
integration leading to air and naval forces that can launch networked,
integrated attacks-in-depth to disrupt, destroy, and defeat an adversary's
A2/AD capabilities.
At its core, ASB seeks a "pre-integrated" joint force that possesses
habitual relationships, interoperable and complementary cross-domain
capabilities, and realistic, shared training, while retaining the
flexibility to develop new TTPs on the fly. Such forces will provide the
strategic deterrence, assurance, and stabilizing effects of a "force in
being" and will also be operationally useful at the outset of hostilities,
without delays for buildups and extensive mission rehearsal. Moreover, they
will ensure that a joint force commander has a full range of options when
facing an adversary with an A2/AD capability.
Another way to put this is that ASB seeks to preserve U.S. and allied
air-sea-space superiority. It is this level of domain control that unlocks a
land force's deterrent and war-fighting potential. If air and naval forces
cannot establish control of the air, space, cyberspace, and maritime
environments or if they cannot sustain deployed forces, no operational
concept is tenable. If ground forces cannot get to the fight or be sustained
in an advanced A2/AD environment, they will fail to serve the vital
interests of America, our allies, and the international system.
We may have developed a blind spot to this perennial truth, mainly because
U.S. and allied forces have enjoyed uncontested freedom of action in the
air, sea, and space domains for more than a generation. Some who write about
conflict in contested areas seem to assume future adversaries will not
effectively oppose deployment and sustainment of ground, air, or naval
forces. That has been largely true over the past two decades, but will not
be guaranteed in the future. Against advanced adversaries, freedom of action
cannot be taken for granted.
A FUTURE WITHOUT ASB?
Perhaps the best way to understand the value of the ASB concept is to
imagine a future where its integrated air and naval capabilities and
capacity do not exist.
In such a future, attempts to use the familiar expeditionary model of
massing combat power -- the so-called "iron mountain" -- at a handful of
main operating bases to conduct extensive mission rehearsal and subsequently
seize the initiative at a time and place of the Joint Force commander's
choosing, may not be feasible. Advanced adversaries could deny secure U.S.
land basing at very long ranges, preventing air and naval forces from
gaining local air superiority. Sea basing could also be challenged and
attempts at ad hoc integration may be insufficient. Enemy capabilities could
prevent surface action groups from operating at effective ranges and sea
control may therefore be untenable. Space and cyberspace access would not be
assured, and global communications and the exchange of information could be
held hostage by any motivated aggressor.
Without freedom of action in the air, sea, and space provided by integrated
air and naval forces, aggressive nations with proliferated A2/AD
capabilities could restrict or close off international airspace and vital
sea lanes at will. Joint forces attempting to undo such aggression would
face robust area denial threats and be required to operate in a
heavily-contested environment.
Lacking the networked, integrated force required to prevail in such
conditions, U.S. and allied forces may not be able to prevent the
undermining of the interconnected international systems of finance, trade,
security and law enabled by access to the global commons. The loss of a
secure global commons could weaken alliances, partnerships, and the rule of
law and could force other nations to accommodate regional hegemons and make
the world permanently less free. In this future, it would not matter how
capable any ground assault forces are because, without freedom of action in
the global commons, the joint force could not credibly deploy and sustain
them.
A BETTER FUTURE
Air-Sea Battle seeks a better future -- one that employs teamwork between
air and naval forces to maintain U.S. superiority in the air, space, and
cyberspace, and at sea, at an acceptable cost, allowing the joint force to
shape future A2/AD environments, deter other nations from threatening the
global commons, and use all service and joint competencies to defeat a
capable A2/AD adversary when necessary.
Though it is meant to facilitate all courses of action, the concept itself
is not provocative. Instead, it is designed to produce forces that are more
likely to have a stabilizing effect, making a major war less likely. ASB air
and naval forces will allow the U.S. and its allies to avoid relying on more
escalatory capabilities that existentially threaten another nation or its
leadership (e.g. nuclear escalation or threat of invasion), or involve
alternatives that are inherently defensive and less likely to deter
adventurism and regional coercion (e.g. ceding the commons and relying on
blockades and offensive mining).
In some cases, the commander might use such air and naval forces to deter
potential adversaries; assure allies, friends, and partners; and keep the
global commons open and accessible to all. In other situations, he or she
may need to use the freedom of action provided through ASB for strike
operations, forcible entry, or other methods of power projection.
Development of forces with this level of integration and capability will
require years of effort and significant institutional change. This change
has begun in the departments of the Navy and Air Force; the CNO and CSAF
have written: "The Air-Sea Battle operational concept will guide our efforts
to train and prepare air and naval forces for combat. We already train
together and share joint doctrine. Under Air-Sea Battle, we will take
'jointness' to a new level, working together to establish more integrated
exercises against more realistic threats."
In an ever-changing world that demands continued U.S. leadership, concepts
like Air-Sea Battle are essential to sustaining America's military freedom
of action and ability to project power.