Battle of Britain 1944

[komata]

My fellow forum members:

On 2 December 2014, while in the course of a discussion about another topic, pjw4118 posed to me the following question:

‘…What about the Battle of Britain fought again but four years later. So the RAF put up the Tempest and mustangs against FW 190D, Ta 152 and Me 262. While at night the Luftwaffe [LW] have Arados and He 219’s’.

Out of interest, (and for fun) I have since undertaken a quick analysis of the question, although it is, admitedly based very largely on hypothesis and 'manipulation' of historical facts. As a result, I would have to say that, if history was 'revised' and the actual events that occurred between 3 September 1939 and June 1944 were ignored (being replaced instead by an extended 'Phony War', involving a repeat of the 1915-1918 trench-based Western Front 'stalemate') the British would have lost a 1944 Battle of Britain.  To a degree, this would have been due in part to an alteration of German tactical thinking, and a concentration on 'Oil, Airfields and Radar'. However, IMHO the end result would have been largely due to the advent and rapid implementation by the Luftwaffe of both the jet engine and guided missile technology; technology against-which the RAF (and, indeed, the British nation) had no short-term means of defence.

The analysis is unfortunately (or 'fortunately' depending-upon one's viewpoint) several pages long, so rather than occupy a lot of space by presenting it here in its entirety, I would merely reiterate that, largely as a result of technological advances against which they had no defence, the RAF would have lost the 1944 Battle of Britain  and that, eventually, the country would have been occupied by German forces. 

As I said, this conclusion is based on a 'revision' of the facts, and hypothesis, so should not be taken with any degree of seriousness.  However, if anyone would like to have some fun with the topic and discuss / debate the outcome (Britain Lost!) I would be interested in what eventuates. 

Let the discussion commence...

(BTW: and only because some might need to know, amongst the 'bits of paper' attached to my name are a degree in history and political science....)

[nuuumannn]

Oooh, I like this sort of thing, Komata, but can't access your hypothesis at the moment, so I'll throw a few things in the ring for now.

However, IMHO the end result would have been largely due to the advent and rapid implementation by the Luftwaffe of both the jet engine and guided missile technology; technology against-which the RAF (and, indeed, the British nation) had no short-term means of defence.

Firstly, the one thing you are ignoring in this statement alone is situational awareness of the strategic campaign as a whole. Bear in mind that in the real world, the British were aware of the existence of the Me 262 and German rocket programmes more than a year before they entered service thanks to photographic recon and its network of spies. This resulted in accelerated effort by Gloster on the Meteor, thus having the impact of that firm not continuing with its potentially excellent Reaper twin engined fighter, a sustained bombing campaign against Peenemunde and German airfields where the jets were based - Rechlin in particular and the factories where components were made, such as the Junkers engine works by Bomber Command and the 8th AF, also by that time, mid 1943, the Vampire had flown already, as had the Meteor. By Early 1944 the Air Staff were panicking and believed that by the end of the year and early 1945 the Germans would have over 1,000 jet and rocket fighters - the British became aware of the Me 163 before the Me 262. By late 1944, the Air Staff had revised its stance on the 262 and the German jet programme as the fears they had were not going to be realised. This came about after a 262 had crashed in France and its remains were sent to the UK for analysis, and based on a combat report by an RAF pilot, the British made an assessment of the aircraft, which proved considerably accurate in terms of performance and technical details. The RAF subsequently change its stance on the German jet programme as it figured out that the Air Staff's fears were far from being realised. The US had a different view as the 262s and 163s were chasing its bombers, which led to further direct attacks against production facilities and airfields. This, combined with almost total air superiority over Western Europe meant the German jets' impact on the course of events were not a bang, but a whimper in the end. Of course, hypothesising makes for much sport.

So, what can we make of this in a fantasy scenario? Firstly, British jet technology ran simultaneous to German and you can guarantee that Britain would have accelerated its efforts once it became known the Germans were doing the same - consequently, in reality although the Brits were very aware of what the Germans were up to, the Germans hadn't a clue that the Brits were to the stage they were at with their jet development at all; the Germans had neither photographic recon coverage over Britain nor a spy network (It's well known that German spies in Britain during the war were all double agents and feeding the Abwehr with deliberately false information). With every measure comes an equal or greater countermeasure and so wars are fought, hot or cold. Wiping the slate clean means a new beginning, but there are rules to doing so, and you can predict that as in convention, the same processes will apply. I've come across similar debates where Luftwaffe fans state that the war could have been won by hoards of 262s suddenly appearing from nowhere to attack US 8th AF bomber formations and thus changing the course of history. But for superior Allied intelligence services throughout the war, such a scenario might have been possible.

From early on, during the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe had superior technology with which to carry out devastating precision attacks against British strategic targets. In 1940 the Luftwaffe had the most advanced and most accurate bombing force in the world, bar none. It was the only force in the world equipped with sophisticated electronic navigation and bombing aids capable of directing its bombers to target areas and releasing bombs within a specified area. It wouldn't be for another two years before RAF Bomber Command had anything similar and it relied on star fixes and dead reckoning for night bombing at the time. This equipment, Knickebein, X-Gerat and Y-Gerat was extraordinarily effective and was put to use against Warsaw, Rotterdam and more infamously, Coventry, but thankfully, the Germans sought not to use it to its full potential. British Scientific Intelligence Head Prof R.V. Jones hypothesised that if it were used to attack industrial targets rather than the centres of cities, then the results would be devastating. With resources available to him he and his team devised a series of deceptive measures to this technology, which became known as 'Beam Bending'.

Where does this get us? The Germans did not exploit the technology to their fullest advantage, but then another factor comes into play also. One of the aspects of the Battle of Britain that led to the German defeat in that conflict was its almost wholesale lack of strategic intelligence, which led the Germans to believing they were doing better than they were actually doing. Perhaps their biggest lack was not long range tanks for the Bf 109 as many have stipulated, but lack of post raid reconnaissance. Every time the Germans bombed an airfield or a city, they had no way of determining the outcome of their attack, which meant they couldn't accurately decipher how much damage they had done. Unlike British bombers later in the war, the German bombers didn't carry cameras aboard that went off once bombs were dropped at that time. This led the Luftwaffe to make needless attacks against the same airfields regularly, believing they were different targets. They were also not fully aware of the extent that the British were using sattellite airfields to operate their fighters from (although some of these were subject to attack), so came to the false conclusion that they had almost compeltely wiped RAF Fighter Command out, although they were far from doing so.

The switch to attacks against London were going to happen regardless and although we accept that this was the turning point in the battle, the Germans did so because they overestimated the extent of the damage they had done and whilst it was extensive and a close run thing for Fighter Command, it was not the end and all the command needed was a reprieve. Such was the lack of intel the Germans had. This was achieved by Britain's sophisticated air defece network; the radar chain worked. Every time a photo recon aircraft ventured into British air space, it was shot down. This situation remained for the duration, with the exception of aircraft like the Ju 86P, eventually high altitude Spitfires came into play, which were able to bring these down and the Arado Ar 234, which nothing could stop, but the Germans were in such disarray by that time - late '44, early '45, they were in no position to take advantage of their jets' qualities.

The other aspect not mentioned here yet is the fact that the German attacks against British airfields were the prelude to invasion. Operation Sealion. A failed idea if there ever was one. Could the Germans do it in 1944? Definitely not. They ahd neither the ships nor the resources to launch a full scale attack on Britain. Couldn't do it in 1940 either. A phony War for four years might have enabled the Germans to build up resurces, but again, we have to look at countermeasures to anything they might be achieving in their ports. We also have to assume that France is not invaded, because once the Germans do that, all out war would most certainly be declared against the Reich. Not having France means the Germans have to fly from Germany and carry out their naval sorties from there to. The only port available to them is in the Baltic/North Sea. An effective naval blockade against them would cenable the british to be able to effectively monitor any movement. Bear in mind that with the Admiralty code breakers during WW1 in Room 40 having cracked the German naval codes, the British Grand Fleet were aware the German High Seas Fleet were about to put to sea and sailed from Scapa some time before the Germans left Wilhelmshaven before Jutland in 1916.

Lets also not forget the work being done by the code breakers at Bletchley Park in WW2 - timely as a new movie abour Alan Turing is being released, starring Benedict Cummerbund as the man himself.

Again, lessons? Intel wins wars as much as technology and it played a not insignificant part in the Allied victory. You can guarantee that British intel during any fantasy war would behave the same. Why not? British spies were everywhere and the more nations oppressed by the Nazis, the more their population would lend assistance by proxy to the British at any rate.

So, Komata, let's start again.

[nuuumannn]

Sorry about the length...

[komata]

Thanks Neumann

Because of the size of my notes, certain things were omitted in my opening posting, a fact alluded-to in the post's paragraph 4.

However, as the topic has now become ‘live’ (for which I thank you), herewith the following: I think it is self-explanatory (and terribly 'revisionist, but then this is only a 'game' after all) and is based on a scenario that was a distinct possibility at the time. I would be interested in your response, based on what I have posted. I suspect that your reply could alter.....

Fun isn't it?

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GEOPOLITICAL

1. After a long period of ‘relative’ inaction (the ‘Sitzkreig’) with both sides indulging in trench and ‘fixed’ warfare involving both the Siegfried and Maginot Lines, German forces had launched a series of well-co-ordinated attacks via the Ardenne across the Lowlands and France and had succeeded in forcing the Allies off the European mainland.

2. The Germans had not invaded the Soviet Union, with the Mutual Non-Aggression Pact being honoured by both sides 'to the letter' , in recognition of their mutual distrust.

3. The Japanese had reached an agreement with the USA concerning the supplies of ‘needed materials’ and sphere’s of influence and that country was consolidating its hold on Asia and the Pacific.  The US provided  tacit approval for the Japanese actions, as it viewed the Japanese expansioin as being a method of ‘neutralising’ the British Empire; a neutralising which would allow American influence to expand and become dominant.

4. D-Day (6 June 1944) did not occur and there were no plans to undertake such a venture; the Dieppe fiasco being too recent and damaging to risk another attempt.

5. Although Hitler had declared War on the USA, the American response was ‘muted’ due to the prevailing ‘isolationist’(‘America First’) policies of Thomas Dewey (who had defeated Roosevelt), Charles Lindbergh and others. The US response consisted of the implementation of Lend Lease and the sending of a ‘token’ bomber and fighter force to Britain. This force was under the control of US ‘advisors’ who acted in liaison-with, but not in tandem -with the British military administration.

6. Invasion Plans: The German High Command was caught napping by the speed of its advance into Western Europe. However, despite this, it quickly formulated plans for an invasion of the British Isles, and after consultation concluded that this could be accomplished if the RAF was eliminated, or, if that was not possible, at least reduced in size and effectiveness. Recognising the need to ‘paralyse; the RAF, the German GHQ decided on a policy of ‘Oil, Airfields and Radar’ and formulated plans to (a) destroy merchant shipping beyond the British isles (with tankers as a priority), (b) destroy and paralyse all known RAF airfields and (c) destroy all radar installations, effectively ‘Blinding’ the RAF. The existence of the Royal Observer Corps was acknowledged, but its role was not fully understood, there being no direct German equivalent.

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[pjw4118]

What have I started ?
The simple thought was to move 1940 to 1944 , with war having been being declared in 1943 not 1939. So there has been no extended preliminaries from 1939. But the two Airforces were equipped with the full range of developed aircraft available in 1944.
The books on a German occupied UK make interesting reading and it is well recorded that plans were in hand to evacuate the Monarchy , Bank of England and the Fleet to Canada. But forget all that , its about two forces flying the best aircraft they had . I believe that the RAF Staff college has refought this battle a number of times using various modelling programmes.
Over to you

[nuuumannn]

Thanks Peter. I do find such scenarios interesting, but I take the position that mitigating circumstances led to the course of history that was taken and therefore things happened the way they did because of what happened beforehand. Pitting Fw 190Ds and Ta 152Hs against Tempests and Spitfire XIVs in 1944 makes for a bit of fun but rather ignores the strategic effects of four years of war against the Reich. Sorry; I study history so can't help it! Komata has detailed the background geopolitical situation, which on first glance seems plausible, but we'll see. Anyway, let's have some fun - despite my rather serious demeanour in print, I do enjoy this kind of thing. I would like to see the entire document however.

Great stuff, Komata, let's see now:

Point 1: how long is this relatively long period? The one thing I find difficult to believe is that the Germans would indulge in 'trench warfare'; not going to happen with the likes of von Paulus in command of the Panzers. When enacting the Schlieffen Plan prior to the outbreak of the Great War, the Germans asked the British for their support in their going through Belgium, to which the British responded with a declaration of war once the Germans began. The Wehrmacht dispensed with such formalities during WW2. The speed of their advance caught everyone by surprise, including themselves. If Germany goes into France through the Low Countries again, you can guarantee the Brits will declare war, and then its on, with all the tribulations that took place in reality.

2. The invasion of the Soviet Union, or at least the eradication of communism was always something that Hitler wanted. The Molotov/Ribbentrop Pact and the invasion of Poland were all a part of this. Making a treaty with the Russians was done with the intent of dividing Poland; Russia gets half and the Germans the other. The Nazis did this with the intent of dispensing with the obstacle of Poland between the Reich and the Soviet Union in the same manner that demanding that Sudeten Germans living around the Czech/German border were incorporated into the greater Reich territory. This removed the border defences the Czechs had set up to deter a German invasion. Hitler made his dislike of the communists well known in Mein Kampf, as well as his desire for lebensraum in the east. There was never going to be any other outcome; the whole thing was about invading the Soviet Union and getting rid of communism, as well as getting France back, and the Jews...

3. I can't see Roosevelt allowing the US to act in a method that allowed the Japanese to take possession of British territories in Asia, bearing in mind it might have a direct impact on American territories in the region. Opposition to British plans for re-establishing the Empire post-war is well known, but Roosevelt would not act on Japan at a time of peace without consulting the British.

4. Hmm, fatalistic. Certainly Churchill was nervous about amphibious landings, but not as a result of Dieppe, but because of the Dardanelles fiasco. this explains why he was keen on 'Europe's soft underbelly' as he put the stepping stones to invading Italy. The Americans were keen to get into France as quickly as possible, as was Stalin and both parties put pressure on Churchill to do so, but He knew, through bitter experience that neither his, nor the American armed forces were experienced enough to take on the Reich full frontal until more experience had been won. Operation Torch was a part of this. Again, like Barbarossa, Overlord was going to happen.

5. Changes a couple of the above answers, but I do believe that the Americans would eventually step in, as they had during the Great War. There are considerable parallels between the two conflicts involving the Americans' involvement. The Germans during WW1 were initially not keen on upsetting the Americans too much, this is why after the sinking of the Lusitania they withdrew their unrestricted submarine warfare policy of shoot without warning. This was again put into place in late January 1917, however. America would be drawn in and maybe to begin with a token force, but, as we know from history, escalation of American support would be inevitable.

6. Yep, pretty much what the Germans planned on, but could not execute. Prblem with the invasion of Britain was that it was not planned in as much depth and with much planning as previous invasions had been and the German high command baulked at the suggestion when it was first made. The Wehrmacht, buoyed by its recent successes regarded it as simply another river crossing, but the Germans were desperately unprepared for an invasion. I have a book on how the Germans might have achieved it and it is fascinating reading, but, unattainable. See the Wikipedia entry on Sealion for a good synopsis of the German invasion plans:

"The great majority of military historians believe Operation Sea Lion had little chance of success. Kenneth Macksey asserts it would have been possible only if the Royal Navy had refrained from large-scale intervention[71] and the Germans had assaulted in July 1940 (although Macksey conceded they were unprepared at that time),[72] while others such as Peter Fleming, Derek Robinson and Stephen Bungay believe the operation would have most likely resulted in a disaster for the Germans. Len Deighton and some other writers have called the German amphibious plans a "Dunkirk in reverse".[73] Robinson argues that the massive superiority of the Royal Navy over the Kriegsmarine would have made Sea Lion a disaster.

Reichsmarschall Hermann Goring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, believed the invasion could not succeed and doubted whether the German air force would be able to win control of the skies; nevertheless he hoped that an early victory in the Battle of Britain would force the UK government to negotiate, without any need for an invasion.[74] Adolf Galland, commander of Luftwaffe fighters at the time, claimed invasion plans were not serious and that there was a palpable sense of relief in the Wehrmacht when it was finally called off. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt also took this view and thought that Hitler never seriously intended to invade Britain and the whole thing was a bluff to put pressure on the British government to come to terms following the Fall of France.[75] He observed that Napoleon had failed to invade and the difficulties that confounded him did not appear to have been solved by the Sea Lion planners. In fact, in November 1939, the German Naval staff produced a study on the possibility of an invasion of Britain and concluded that it required two preconditions, air and naval superiority, neither of which Germany ever had.[76] Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz believed air superiority was not enough and admitted, "We possessed neither control of the air or the sea; nor were we in any position to gain it."[77] Grand Admiral Erich Raeder thought it would be impossible for Germany to successfully invade the UK; he instead called for Malta and the Suez Canal to be overrun so German forces could link up with Japanese forces in the Indian Ocean to bring about the collapse of the British Empire in the Far East, and prevent the Americans from being able to use British bases if the United States entered the war.[78]

As early as 14 August 1940 Hitler had told his generals that he would not attempt to invade Britain if the task seemed too dangerous, before adding that there were other ways of defeating the UK than invading.[79]"

Here en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion

[nuuumannn]

I guess I find the whole idea of the fact that Germany had jets and rockets and launched a successful attack on the UK rather obvious and I could have predicted their victory without expending pages on it, although as I stated earlier, there's no way the Germans could have successfully launched an invasion of Great Britain in 1940, nor 1944. A realistic assessment of such a bombing campaign in 1944 is Operation Steinbock.

This from Wikipedia: "Placed under the command of Generalmajor (Major–General) Dietrich Peltz, Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3), the Germans assembled 474 bomber aircraft for the offensive. The attacks were mainly aimed at and around the Greater London area. In Britain, it was known as the 'Baby Blitz' due to the much smaller scale of operations compared to The Blitz, the Luftwaffe's campaign against the British Isles in 1940–41.[2] The operation began in January and ended in May 1944.

The operation achieved very little, and the German force suffered a loss of some 329 machines during the five months of operations—an average of 77 per month—before it was abandoned. Other senior Luftwaffe commanders had intended to use the bomber force against the Western Allied invasion fleet, which they predicted would land in Northern France sometime in the spring or summer of 1944. Eventually, the revenge attacks gave way to attempts to disrupt preparations for the impending Allied invasion of France, codenamed Operation Overlord, but Steinbock had worn down the offensive power of the Luftwaffe to the extent it could not mount any significant counterattacks when the invasion began on 6 June 1944.[4]

The offensive was the Luftwaffe's last large-scale bombing campaign against England using conventional aircraft, and henceforth only the V-1 flying bomb cruise missiles and V-2 rockets — pioneering short-range ballistic missiles — were used to strike British cities.[5]"

Here: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Steinbock

Komata, could you post more on the paper? Cheers.

[The Red Baron]

Germany never developed a successful heavy day bomber,the closest they had was the unreliable He 177.

[nuuumannn]

Versions of the Dornier Do 217 was also considered by the Luftwaffe as a heavy bomber, the Do 217 M had a maximum load (carried internally and externally) of 4,000 kgs or 8,800 lbs, which was a greater load than that carried by the B-17G; 8,000 lbs on short range missions. The Do 217K was initially produced owing to the delays that affected the He 177 programme.

[komata]

Nuumann

Thanks for the response; being able to 'manipulate' (revise') history is always an interesting pastime. As requested herewith some more from my analysis. I would emphasise that what I've done is only very quick, and without benefit of 'learned tomes'. Not cut and paste, but a lot of reading in a short space of time. With that explained, on we go:

No doubt a lot of 'holes'' can be picked in what appears below.  In summary, the German's were well ahead of the British in respect of technology and the use of the jet engine.  I believe the basic premise presented below stands by itself. 


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AVIATION

British aviation was focussed on the production of piston-engined military aircraft, with the Supermarine Spitfire and Hawker Tempest II (Centaurus) being the current front-line interceptors. The North American Mustang was available under Lend-lease, but only in its Allison-engined form. Rolls Royce was working on a ‘Merlin’ installation in an attempt to improve the aircraft’s speed at height, but the conversions were taking time, and North American was not especially interested in any modification, believing that its product was superior to anything extant in Europe. Bombers were all piston engined, with the Avro Lancaster, and Handley Page Halifax forming the 'heavy' component of the air arm, with the De Havilland Mosquito and (lend lease supplied) Douglas Boston and Lockheed Ventura providing the medium and light-bomber component. Bristol Beaufighter's and DH Mosquito's also provided interdictory capability. The RAF had no Jet bomber types in service.

The jet engine was regarded as an ‘object of interest’ and the Gloster Meteor 1 had flown earlier in the year. However, it was only equipping one unit (616 SQN) in July 1944. The De Havilland Vampire was still ‘under development’. (and would not fly until 1945). There were no other jet-powered fighter or bomber aircraft in service or under development at that stage

German aviation had enthusiastically embraced the jet engine as a means of propulsion, and was designing and building a series of fighters and bombers to use this new means of propulsion. It had also put long-range piston-engined heavy bombers into production , and developed the concept of strategic bombing, largely as a result of its experience in France and Eastern Europe, and a realisation that it was necessary to ‘reach’ as far into the enemy’s homeland as possible. A jet-powered heavy bomber was also being produced in quantity.

MISSILES

An enthusiastic supporter of guided missile technology, and as a result of high loses to its bomber aircraft in ‘combat’ situations, the Luftwaffe high Command had been persuaded of the desirability of ‘stand-off’ air launched guided missiles; machines which could be despatched at a distant point and guided to the target; minimising potential damage to the launching aircraft. As a result of experimentation, the Luftwaffe had developed a series of air-launched rocket-powered and winged missiles, most notably the Fritz-X and Henschel 293, The success of the Fritz-X type against the Italian battleship Roma had strengthened this interest and from that had developed these into a series of air launched missiles which could be used against land and maritime targets. The technology was also applied to jet powered fighter aircraft (both piston and jet-powered) and ‘rockets’ were now a standard part of fighter armament; the R4M being especially effective. The V.2 ICBM was entering service, while the The V.1 'cruise missile-equivalent was also being produced in quantity.

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[nuuumannn]

Great to see, Komata, although I'm thinking that you are making it far too easy for the Germans; the reality was as I pointed out at the beginning; there's no way the British would be so complacent about German technological advances and in reality they weren't. Nevertheless, I've been thinking about this and I reckon I could give your Uberluftwaffe a run for its money with the scenario you have offered.

Mid 1944; two days before the first bombing raid. It's 7 am and Churchill is lying in bed asleep as he often did. There is a knock on the door and Churchill grumbles his disapproval. A folder is handed to the PM and he reads its contents with little expression. "And so it begins..." He starts; "Get everyone in for a meeting at 9."
Ultra decrypts have revealed that the German build up of aircraft and equipment that had been taking place over the last few weeks in Wetsern France is a prelude to a new bombing offensive against Britain, beginning in two day's time; something the British military high command had been fearing for some time. Within the next few hours, PRU Spitfires and Mosquitoes are heading from RAF Benson for the continent, as well as tac recon Mustangs. Spitfires are sent north over Belgium and the Netherlands as well as over France to confirm the state of the build up of equipment. The Belgium and Netherlands aircraft are sent over known radar sites - this serves two purposes, a feint to alert the Germans to an attack against radar sites and therefore not against airfields - the British don't wish the Germans to know that they know what's about to happen and to make a hole in the radar defences in advance of an air raid. V-1 launch sites, which have been monitored since early in the year are photographed by the Mustangs, while the Mosquitoes head for key airfields within France. Three Spitfires fail to return.

By dusk, a better picture of the German build up has been established and with considerable haste, Fighter Command and Bomber Command have had their evening's work retasked for them. Just before sun down, two squadrons of Mosquitoe F.B.VIs take off with top cover provided by a squadron of Hawker Tempests. This strike package is bound for the radar sites and causes considerable damage, thus putting a hole in the German defences. Further south, Mandrel equipped Bristol Beaufighters begin flying a pattern toward Northern france, which alerts the radar sites in their vicinity to a raid that doesn't exist. Window is dropped, which adds to the confusion between the radar sites and German night fighters launched to counter a fictitious raid. Further south, however, a second strike package comprising three Mosquito squadrons are sent south at low level to attack coastal and inland airfields. Approaching from the south, the German defences are caught napping and bombing attacks cause considerable damage at a number of airfields with heavy bombers ranged out in the open. The two different Mosquito raids return with little losses after dark, just as the first of the Bomber Command heavies make their way to formate for a massed attack against Berlin; the target - the German Air Ministry, the RLM building is enormous and stands out like a sore thumb in recon images. Pathfinder Mosquitoes of 8 Group lead the bombers through the gaps in the German radar defences toward the Big City. The raid creates considerable havoc, being concentrated in the centre of Berlin, although night fighter defences are heavy and losses of bombers are high - out of some 500 aircraft, 9 percent fail to return.

At this stage the airfields where the raids are to be launched from have not been attacked, but the RAF are confident that the next day will prove crucial in stemming the German offensive. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy's stationing of a carrier in the North Sea ports proves useful as a raid is launched against V-1 sites and their infrastructure in France using Corsairs as attack aircraft, with Hellcats as top cover. Considerable damage is done to railways and ramps, which, despite the Germans' best attempts at camouflage are quite obvious. These dusk attacks affect aiming to a degree, but a high altitude Wellington provides radio guidance to the navy aircraft toward the target. The Wellington crews also warn the FAA aircraft of the impending arrival of fighters; Fw 190s in numbers. This use of the Wellington is the first use of airborne early warning to direct aircraft against targets and warn them of incoming enemy aircraft [fact - the RAF did develop an AEW Wellington during WW2, which was used to direct Beaufighters against He 111s carrying air launched V-1s in late 1944]. The FAA sustains heavy Hellcat losses owing to the large number of German fighters, but the Corsairs acquit themselves well against the defenders. Considerable damage is done to the coastal V-1 sites, although not all were attacked, a number escaping harm due to camouflage measures.

After an active night, the pace is unrelenting. At first light, RAF medium bombers are launched with Spitfire XIV escorts for further air raids against airfields and infrastructure around the French coast. For some of these, damage had been done the night before and the massed attack of over 200 Mitchells, Bostons and Mosquitoes adds to the destruction on the ground. Medium bomber losses are at 6 percent, with the Sptifires being kept occupied against Me 262s; both sides receive fighter losses, the Spitfires can easily out manoeuvre the German jets, but find that because of their high speed they can break off combat at will. Nevertheless, the 262s are not left unscathed as the Spitfires rely on slow manoeuvres to hinder the German jet pilots in their throttle management; jet fighters have a slow response time to changes in power settings and are poor performers at low speeds; several 262s are lost owing to engine burn outs. Fighter Command Squadrons had previously carried out exercises against Meteors in order to exploit weaknesses in the jets' tactics [this actually happened - 616 (Meteor) Squadron exercised with both Spitfire and Mustang squadrons to give them experience in dealing with Me 262s following D-Day]. Once this early morning raid has returned to the UK, another is launched, this time using Lancasters against inland airfields, escorted by high altitude Mosquitoes as the lancs run in at low altitude. The Mosquitoes drop Window to confuse radar and fighters are left on the ground refuelling and rearming after the morning activities. The Lancasters also approach Brittany from the south, which again leads to confusion among the defences, expecting more attacks from the north, where the medium bombers had flown from. Simultaneously, the FAA is brought in again to provide a feint attack and to provide extra fighter cover for the Lancasters in the form of Corsairs as they approach the coast. The Lancasters' blockbuster bombs cause considerable damage to hangars and rail yards, but despite the feints, interceptors claim many kills; the RAF and FAA lose 14 percent of the attacking force - a high amount, but considerable damage is done to airfields and aircraft.

That evening, low level strafing raids by Mosquitoes are launched against airfields and targets of opportunity along the northern French, Belgian and Netherlands coastline - again, this is a feint and covers for a heavy raid against the Ruhr valley; the German industrial heartland. This targets steel, aluminium and synthetic production, all of which supply the aircraft industry. A further raid is launched against Dusseldorf; in the heart of the Ruhr Valley. This is a fire attack and the city is laid waste in a fire storm that burns for several weeks. Like the Berlin raid, losses of bombers are high however; 9 percent of some 800 bombers. At dawn, following the first photo recon flights into the air over the night's target area, fighter squadrons ranged across 11 Group are readied for the first of the morning attacks. As a prelude, an FAA Corsair shoots down a German He 115 engaged on a Wekusta sortie. An early morning Mosquito raid is launched against V-1 launch sites, which the British believe would herald the opening round for the attacks, but by 9:30am, the Chain Home stations are unable to report any significant activity. As a precaution, Hawker Typhoons and Tempests are scrambled as an attack package to strike at German airfields where increased activity had been reported from recon flights. Meanwhile, RAF medium bombers are also readied for further strikes on inland targets to keep the pressure up.

The rest of the country sits and waits... "The bastards are up to something..."

[pjw4118]

What an interesting and creative piece of writing by you both. It certainly raises a number of what ifs.
One thing mentioned above , is the "wild card " nature of the Mosquito as it was a very effective weapon . It also used limited amounts of aluminium which presumably would be in short supply. If fact I have often wondered why large scale production of the Mosquito wasnt ordered (sure Canadian built versions did appear later). When you think of the final cost of a four engined bomber and its seven trained crew with an attrition rate of 5 % or more , the economics of a longer lasting twin crewed aircraft would be much better. I know in some squadrons individual aircraft did two operations in one night ( with different crews). And of course it served in NF and ground attack roles.
Perhaps because it originated as a private venture that showed up some shiny bums in the Air Ministry they ensured that its availability would be limited . SB s can be spiteful as I have read that they withheld contracts to modify Victors from HP to ensure they either joined BAC/BAe or went broke .HP went broke.

[nuuumannn]

Hello Peter,

Thanks for the comments. My idea for this thread is not to show Komata up or anything like that, but to offer a plausable scenario as a counter to his hypothesis. I do feel that his back story is a little too heavily influenced toward a German victory, so I though that smart use of resources might go some way to nullify the supposed advantage that superior technology might bestow on an attacking force. All the scenarios I proposed here were certainly possible; the idea was to keep the Germans' heads down as much as to damage or destroy their aircraft; it's pretty hard to launch an offensive if your airfield is under attack, even if the attackers aren't particularly successful in doing enough damage to render such an offensive unfeasible. My next stage - if Komata still wants to play - was to bring in the Royal Navy. Big gun battleships provide enormous firepower onto targets - again, not just to destroy specific targets, but to distract the enemy from the main goal. Provide a target for the missile armed bombers in the form of some capital warships and they won't go for the cities - yes, I know, rather harsh, but if you are aware that the enemy has such plans in place, you do what you can to stop them. The other objective with this was to destroy missile armed aircraft by using FAA and RAF top cover, thus reducing the numbers of missiles and launchers available for the main offensive. Continuous pressure on the attackers, such as low and high level daylight raids, sneak attacks using fast aircraft such as Mosquitoes and Typhoons at low level and of course, strategic raids by night. Swamping the defences, if you like. Provide diversions of resources and the main offensive will loose some of its stinging power. In 1944, one thing the British were not short of was military equipment capable of doing enormous amounts of damage using conventional means. Use these assets smartly and you can win wars, or at the very least divert catastrophe.

The problem with the Mosquito was that it was so good that everyone wanted it. I don't think that large scale production of the Mosquito wasn't undertaken, after all, over 7,000 of them were built, it's just that the production facilities couldn't build them any faster than they were. One possible scenario that I have come across is potential US production of the aircraft - the USA did build Mosquito engines in the Packard Merlin and the US armed forces showed interest in the type; Hap Arnold thought the Mossie was a better photo recon aircraft than the F-5 (P-38) and requested them for the USAAF - they got over 200 of them. The US Navy were keen on Mosquitoes as land based night fighters also. The issue with US production of a British aeroplane is that the Americans were rather precious about foreign equipment, although to my knowledge I think it was actually discussed - I'll have to look into it.

The evolution of the Mosquito makes an interesting tale also, but there are a few misconceptions. The idea of high speed bombers was not new when the DH.98 was originally proposed and many in the Air Ministry actually supported the idea, including procurement personnel and Ludlow-Hewitt, Bomber Command head before the war. In 1937 George Volkert, HP's chief designer prepared a paper on high speed unarmed bombers using P.13/36 as a basis of comparison (P.13/36 was the twin engined bomber spec that produced the Manchester and the HP.56, which was modified with four engines to become the Halifax). His idea was to shock the Air Ministry into thinking along a different path and the idea was roundly supported. problem was, the power operated gun turret was just entering development to the extent of production use and it was firmly believed that it could provide credible defence against enemy fighters. At the time the British led the world in turret development, with Boulton Paul and the A Mk.I turret, which was the four gun unit fitted to the Defiant based on the French developed de Boysson turret, at the forefront of this, since it was more advanced technologically than its contemporaries. This obsession with the turret manifested itself in the fact that Ludlow-Hewitt stated with regards to Volkert's paper that what the RAF needed was not an unarmed bomber, but a "Speed Bomber", whatever he interpreted that to be.

The issue the Air Ministry bods had with the DH.98 was that they just didn't believe GdeH's performance figures and so rubbished the aircraft. Sholto-Douglas went one further and demanded that the DH.98 was to be fitted with a power operated tail turret, much to GdeH's consternation and the unarmed prototype under construction was to be a demonstrator rather than a full prototype. Thankfully, this is where Freeman steps in and states the tail turret Mossie would be a disaster because of the loss of performance that Bishop and GdeH knew a turret would bestow on the aircraft. This was all before the prototype flew for the first time. It's also worth noting that Blackburn was simultaneously developing a high speed bomber at the same time as the Mosquito, this was the B.28 and was loosely based on the Botha torpedo bomber, but powered by Griffons. A mock-up was completed, but no metal was cut on the aircraft. It was designed for unarmed reconnaissance and as a heavy fighter bomber armed with cannon, much like the Mossie FB.VI. This demonstrates that there was support for the idea, just not for the Mosquito. Thankfully the Air Ministry naysayers changed their minds once the Mosquito demonstrated its teeth.

[komata]

Neumann

No, I haven't 'abandoned' the game, although I am at the moment somewhat busy on other matters. However, to continue...

June 1944: German Junkers 390 Maritime reconnaissance aircraft, working in tandem with U-boats, attack convoys bound for the UK, using Air to Surface missiles. This is something new in maritime warfare with this 'stand-off' capability giving the 390's the ability to stay both out of range of the convoy's AAA and to pin-point specific targets. These are oil tankers, MAC aircraft carriers and troop ships, the rationale behind the targets being to limit the availability of aviation spirit to Britain, (and so reduce the RAF'c abilities), to also remove the MAC-provided air cover over the convoys (and so-protect the MR aircraft), and reduce the available 'man power' for the British military forces. The U-boats mop-up any damaged vessels.

The same basic tactics are used by Luftwaffe jet and piston-engined bombers in coordinated raids against the Royal Navy'as Home Fleet at Scapa Flow, the intention being to neutralise the threat which this fleet would pose to German forces in the event of an invasion across the channel. the local Radar installations were specifically targeted and neutralised. Several Battleships were severely damaged or sunk as a result.

Sorry it's only a short post this time, but thought you would find it of interest. Over to you...

[pjw4118]

Yes do bring in the Royal Navy , despite an enormous investment in capital ships and crews, their offensive role seems to have been limited to supporting landings in Italy and Normandy. Unlike the USN in the Pacific war.
To spark the debate further , the threat of U boats and German airpower seems to have made the Home fleet impotent , left swinging on their Scarpa moorings. In contrast the German fleet seemed to be much more willing to have a go , but suffered badly whenever they tried to operate in force. Perhaps the main role of the RN fleet was the potential threat they posed .

[nuuumannn]

Thanks Komata, at your own leisure. The RN was in fact more willing to engage the Germans at as much opportunity as possible during WW2, certainly the threat of U-boats and mines played a part in deterrence, but its worth remembering that after Barbarossa, the navy had Russian convoys as well as Atlantic battles, the Med and the Far East to contend with. Remember that the Battle of the River Plate, Norwegian campaign, in particular HMS Glowwork attacking the Hipper en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Glowworm_%28H92%29 hunts for the Bismarck and Scharnhorst, attacking the Tirpitz and the Battle of the Barents Sea meant that the RN was using as much of its resources to force the Germans to battle. The Kriegsmarine was the reluctant party, as many of these actions show, a particular example was the Barents Sea operation. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Barents_Sea

Also, you have to bear in mind that by 1944, the Germans only had the pocket battleships Lutzow and Admiral Hipper and the Tirpitz left. The Scharnhorst had been sunk and the Gneisenau was in port after damage suffered during the Channel Dash; she was in the process of being converted into a 15" gun battleship, which was not completed. The heavy cruisers of the Hipper and Prinz Eugen Classes were the only other real effective vessels the Kriegsmarine possessed. The effectiveness of its U-boats were on the wane by 1944; Allied merchant ship production was exceeding losses and long range aircraft were bridging the all important Greenland Iceland UK gap, not to forget the use of escort carriers to shepherd convoys. By 1944 the Kriegsmarine was a spent force, yet although the RN had suffered five major battleship/battlecruiser losses and had lost five big carriers, capital ships wise it still had some fifteen battleships/battlecruisers and five fleet carriers with three about to enter service, two smaller carriers and a large number of escort carriers to call on. There's also the one aspect I mentioned earlier on in the thread, that the German naval codes had been cracked. Both U-boat and other ship movements were being closely monitored and Ultra decrypts were proving very effective in countering their menace. It's interesting to note that the deception the British carried out to prevent the Germans from becoming aware that they had cracked the naval codes worked extremely well. Post war, Donitz admitted that he was completely unaware that the naval codes had been broken.

Anyway, a bit more...

[nuuumannn]

Attacks by German missile armed aircraft certainly prove effective, but construction of merchant shipping in the USA, surreptitiously providing men and materials to the British for some time now since the German U-boats continued to operate and sink shipping in US waters, was exceeding their loss. No convoys were going unescorted by naval vessels and the proliferation of escort carriers had meant that sorties by U-boats into the Atlantic had decreased substantially; the Germans relying on long range air power for the most part. The U-boat situation did not help with an attack on the massive reinforced concrete pens at Lorient and Brest by Tall Boy equipped Lancasters of 617 Sqn. The British were about to up-the-ante in the U-boat war, however.

On D-Day plus One, the Germans had suffered considerable set back to their plans for the new offensive; with airfields under constant attack, the main bomber force in France was forced to postpone, but another element reared its head. Shortly after 10am, a massive explosion rocked the centre of London. This was the first of the V-2 rockets, which the Germans had been hiding. Virtually unstoppable, the mobile launchers meant that they could be hidden almost anywhere and were extremely difficult to find and unstoppable once launched. Photo recon had failed to find the mobile sites and V-2 production had moved to satellite sites within the Reich after the destruction of Peenemunde in bombing raids. A further two explosions around the city were certainly cause for alarm. At around that time, the V-1 launch sites that had not suffered attack began firing their missiles. From deep within the Reich a formation of some 150 He 177s got airborne to begin their assault. These had been missed by the attacking British forces... to be continued; I have to go get a blodd test...