Reefton's own traitor in WWII

[Dave Homewood]

It seems Reefton-born Patrick Heenan, an officer in the British Indian Army, became a spy for the Japanese

www.radionz.co.nz/programmes/black-sheep/story/2018671337/traitor-the-story-of-patrick-heenan-part-1

[davidd]

Interesting to hunt around on the internet a little further - I quickly found widely differing versions of his perceived importance, or lack of such. My opinion is that he was a very minor cog, who probably had little to nil effect on the development or outcome of the Malayan campaign, or even during attacks on his own airfield at Alor Star. Many of the things he was alleged to have done (including one person who maintains he was almost solely responsible for the loss of the entire campaign) are laughable. Also interesting is the radio he used for communications with the Japanese, which was almost certainly of Australian manufacture, and was in fact based on the one invented by a very clever Australian to make possible the entire operation of the 1930s Flying Doctor Service - without it, the service would have been basically non-functional.
One of the main allegations made concerns Heenan's privileged access (as part of his air liaison duties) to "the letter of the day" (a mutual system of confirming aircraft/ship identification), which it is maintained would enable formations of Japanese bombers to approach and enter Allied air space with complete impunity! I am afraid air defence systems of those days may not have been that flash, but they were not totally reliant on "the letter of the day" - it was a rather primitive but multi-layered system, of which most parts were imperfect, mainly because the system was incomplete, or not exercised up to operational perfection. However the "letter of the day" was only of use when aircraft were in close proximity, or at low level, and Allied aircraft (or ground or ship-borne observers) were in a position to see such signals, which were meant to confirm the "friendliness" or otherwise of the unexpected "strangers". If Allied aircraft were scrambled following receipt of advanced warning from radar or ground/ship observers, the interceptors would approach position of the suspected enemy aircraft. Remember that the operations officers in charge of the sector control rooms would have a reasonable idea of the whereabouts of most Allied aircraft, and the line of approach and size of the formation would give a possible indication of the origin of the unidentified aircraft. As the interceptors approached the "strangers" they would get a more accurate idea of the formation size, the general types of aircraft types involved (probably no more accurate at the time than "unidentified twin engine bombers and/or single engine fighters", and the type of formation employed - all useful information. If they did not appear to be British (or perhaps Dutch) types, they would be assumed to be enemy, and this might quickly be confirmed should Japanese insignia be seen on wings, etc., or the "strangers" opened fire in self defence. Any attempt by the Japanese to use "the letter of the day" at this late stage might cause momentary confusion, but the overwhelming evidence of their eyes would rapidly confirm to the Allied pilots that these were enemy aircraft, and the attack would commence. Also should the ground (or ship mounted) defences sight strange formations of unknown and unexpected aircraft approaching in formation, they would almost certainly be assumed to be hostile until proven otherwise, although again last-minute "letter of the day" signals might cause temporary confusion. Once war had fully commenced, any further use of the "letter of the day" by the Japanese would be pointless. That is why Heenan's importance in the great scheme of things should not be overestimated, as such a hairbrained scheme as use of the Allied "letter of the day" by attackers would probably not work very well on first use, if at all, and any further attempts at employing this tactic would be worse than useless if confusing the Allied air defences was the aim. Heenan may have supplied other information of a more general nature, which might have been valuable to Japanese commanders, but as so little, if anything about Heenan's contributions seems to have survived from the Japanese side, that his usefulness to them will probably forever be a mystery.
David D

[Dave Homewood]

You make some interesting and very valid points David. I only listened to the programme after I'd posted above, and whilst listening I could not help thinking how vague everything seemed.

[davidd]

Dave,
Like you, I also listened to the programme (will definitely catch part 2 next week), and as you say, hard facts are very thin on the ground. Nevertheless, the character of Heenan is probably covered as well as is possible considering he died in early 1942. Next to nothing is known about his recruitment by the Japanese (Army or Navy, or whowever ran their "special operatives"). Also lacking is really anything about the nature of the information he may (or may not have) supplied to his masters. However it would seem that his modus operandi was extremely dangerous, so it is little wonder that he was picked up within days of outbreak of war in the Far East (did I get that right?) Looks to be another case of somebody who was shunned by all and sundry, and gradually built up an extreme case of resentment, which eventually manifested itself in rather a strange way. He must have had guts, but was almost certainly NOT a superspy, a category which was probably a very small one.
David D