Question about command responsibility

[Dave Homewood]

Something that was raised in a discussion I was in today... did the Commanding Officer of the New Zealand Fighter Wing, when it was based at Torokina, Bougainville in 1943-44, also command the P-40 squadrons that were passing through Espiritu Santo (No. 2 SU) and Guadalcanal (No. 1 SU)? Or did their overall command come under a different structure from the two squadrons at Torokina?

[davidd]

My understanding Dave is that the "rear" based squadron at that time was under another the command (American of course, as were the squadrons, etc. at in the "forward" base, or bases) for the very good reason that each location was like a little Kingdom, with its own defence infrastructure, radar, logistics, etc., and its own peculiar defence problems. For instance, rear bases would almost certainly think themselves well out of range of Japanese aircraft in the general theatre in which they operated, but if needed, the fighter squadron "working up" there would still be available should the unexpected happen. However they might well feel very vulnerable to enemy submarines, whether they were suspected to be prowling in their area or not. Naturally the forward squadrons were generally better equipped and more numerous than the rear units, for very good reasons, and often a good deal busier too.

However, the CO of the Fighter Wing (naturally located in the "forward" location), did have some interest in the relieving squadron still in the rear area, and liked to be informed of the progress in their operational training before they arrived, and the considered state of their operational efficiency. Also if any of the "forward" squadrons had a particularly "rough time of it" on operations, as happened with 17 Squadron in about December 1943 (when it was located at Ondonga I think), the OC Fighter Wing, probably in conjunction with Islands Group HQ (for logistical input as Islands Group had no operational function), might propose to pull the battered squadron out of the front line (and return it to NZ) and bring up the replacement ahead of the original scheduled time. Needless to say, they would also immediately have to advise the American theatre commander of this proposed change, and why, and so long as the change did not affect the operational efficiency of his total forces, that would normally be the end of it. Just my take on how military forces would handle such things. Actually they (organized military forces, and even makeshift ones come to that) have probably operated like this for thousands of years, probably longer! Didn't have P-40s then, but principles the same, although communications and logistics a bit slower. That Chinese gentleman has probably got the full story in his classic guide to the art of war. You always have to have competent local commanders at all vulnerable points, and operate within general, fairly flexible plans that are clearly understood. That is how I see it anyway.

David D

[Dave Homewood]

Thanks David. Much appreciated.

[davidd]

Just off the top of my head Dave. Actually the command situation could get a bit complicated at times. You are probably aware of the NORSOLS area (created on 1st September 1943), which was an interesting animal, a protrusion of the South Pacific operational area poking across the theatre border into the neighbouring South West Pacific Area. General operational command of the Norsols area was wielded by Douglas MacArthur, US Army, SWPA, but for all logistical purposes, it came under South Pacific jurisdiction, as the two Allied major commands were somewhat separated by the Japanese forces stuck in the middle of the whole mess. Hasten to add that Allied aircraft (and ships) could fly or sail all around these Japanese forces in their midst, so the Allies were quite happy to have their forward air bases located right around the hapless enemy at this time. Thus Allied raids (sea or air) could come from quite a number of these bases simultaneously from different directions if required. All the operational RNZAF forces under the Americans in this forward area were therefore generally under MacArthur, but were actually operating alongside USAAF and USN/USMC air forces of the South Pacific forces, although I think the South Pacific command itself was declared non-operational for all practical purposes in about June 1944, as by this time, no Japanese forces were active in that theatre (with possible exception of the odd submarine, if they had any left by this time).
David D