RNZAF activity at Munda, 1943

[aircraftclocks]

I have started this thread to show what is included in the daily intelligence summary for Air Command New Georgia.
The diaries I have located so far cover the period 14th August to 20 October 1943. This is the day that the RNZAF officially based aircraft at this location.
2 airfield are covered by this command, Munda and Segi.

[aircraftclocks]

Second Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF., Special Action Report, 14 August, 1943 to 20 October, 1943.

The Forward Echelon, Second Marine Aircraft Wing Commanded by Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy, USMC, was designated as the Headquarters, New Georgia Air Force by Commander Task Force Thirty-one's Operation Plan A8-43. The Headquarters, New Georgia Air Force will be referred to in this report as the Air Command. The first phase of the New Georgia Campaign included that portion of the Campaign prior to the time planes were operated from the captured Munda Airfield and has already been reported.
During the second phase, New Georgia Air Force planes were operating from both the Munda and Segi Airfields, and on 17 October, from the Barakoma strip on Vella Lavella also. The missions of this force were:

(1) Assistance in the escorting of bombing raids sent out by ComAirSols;
(2) Providing fighter cover for friendly shipping;
(3) The location and destruction of enemy barges which were his principal means of supply during this period;
(4) Strafing of enemy airfields in Southern Bougainville;
(5) Artillery spotting and reconnaissance missions; and
(6) The protection of our bases. In order to insure the best coordination of all defenses against enemy air attacks, operational control of the air warning system, AA and searchlights was exercised by the Air Command.

On 14 August, 1943 the command post of the Air Command was moved from Rendova to Munda Point when Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy flew over and landed on the strip at 1030. The advance detail had already set up a fighter control, Operations Office, Communications Office, and Intelligence Office in a Japanese built tunnel in Kokengolo Hill. The tunnel had been cleared of debris and dead Japs by the SeeBees but the smell was still quite noticeable and this, combined with the temperature, made the need for blowers quite apparent. It was a protected location however, as only a direct hit near one of the three entrances would have damaged it greatly. It was very conveniently located on the side of the strip and within one of the taxi-loops. The fact that it was completely underground permitted lights to be used and operations to continue at all times. Personnel who worked in the tunnel, lived in tents in the immediate vicinity, and used it as an air raid shelter which saved the time and labor of preparing additional dugouts for their protection. Ready tents and telephonic communications were installed so that when the first fighters arrived at 1500 operations were possible.
During the first few days that operations were conducted from the Munda strip the staff of the Air Command also performed the functions of a Fighter Command and controlled directly the operations of the fighters based at Munda and at Segi. Major E.F. Syms was designated Acting Fighter Commander during this period in addition to his regular duties as Operations Officer, New Georgia Air Force.
The first full day of operations from the Munda strip were conducted on August 15. On that day, the fighters based there and at Segi which was also under the control of the Air Command, provided cover for the initial landing of friendly troops on Vella Lavella. Twenty-four fighters were normally based at each strip, but this number was doubled for the mission assigned on this date, and for other similar missions. The additional planes were returned to the bases at Guadalcanal and the Russells before dark and did not remain in the forward area overnight. It was planned to keep thirty-two planes on patrol over the Task Group making the landing during daylight hours. This plan was adherred to closely as possible although whenever additional planes were scrambled for contacts the next relief for the patrol was necessarily less then thirty-two. It was always built up to the required number as soon as possible. Two enemy air attacks were met and repulsed by the fighter cover. The first occurred at approximately 0830, in which the Japs lost thirteen fighters and eight dive bombers. The second attack was in the late afternoon and Jap losses were two more bombers and four more fighters. Our combat losses for the day were two fighters with one pilot recovered. This day's operation was typical of a covering operation.
Starting on 16 August the Munda Point area, including the SeeBee camp, was subjected to intermittent artillery shelling in addition to the usual night air raids. The enemy artillery was believed to be located on one or more of the small islands to the west of Munda. A single plane patrol was maintained over the area during daylight hours to determine its location and suspected positions were bombed by aircraft and shelled by counter battery fire from friendly artillery. Ground units also proceeded to capture and occupy these islands. The last shelling of our positions near the strip occurred on 19 August.
On 24 August, Col. W. O. Brice became Fighter Commander and with his staff relieved the Air Command personnel of the additional duties which they had been performing. The tunnel was turned over to the Fighter Command at this time and the Air Command moved its offices into tents just outside of the tunnel. Work was proceeding on the permanent offices and camp for the Air Command at a site about one mile northeast of the field. In anticipation of the time when the command would move away from the field a detachment of the operations section was organized as an Acting Strike Command to control all liaison, spotting, and visiting strike aircraft and to operate such miscellaneous planes as were assigned directly to the Air Command. This unit began to function on 27 August 1943. The movement of the Air Command from the field to the permanent location was effected on 14 September.
During the entire period of the report intensive air operations were conducted against the enemy. The fighter planes assigned to this command provided protection for our ground positions and friendly shipping in the New Georgia area but these defensive operations were supplemented by offensive operations in the form of numerous attacks on enemy barges and strafing attacks on enemy airdromes. These fighters also provided escort for bombing missions sent out by ComAirSols. (Usually augmented escort provided by ComAirSols from the Russells and Guadalcanal).
When operations began from the Munda strip all facilities, notably communications and transportation, were extremely limited. The plane servicing and maintainence crews were inexperienced and spare parts were extremely scarce. The field itself was only partially completed and the taxiways and dispersal area were very cramped and in poor condition. Measures for the elimination of all these deficiencies were instituted at once and improvement could be observed daily in all phases of the field operations. These improvements continued throughout the entire campaign and also included improving the living and messing facilities for the combat crews and other personnel which were necessarily crude at the start.
Typical of the offensive operations against enemy barges was the strafing mission on 29 August. Four F4U's were assigned to attack and destroy two barges which had been reported by ground observers to be at Tombulu on the north coast of Vella Lavella. The planes took off at 1558 and proceeded to their target which was located in spite of being well camouflaged. Several strafing runs were made and both barges were set afire. As the planes were returning to base a large river steamer was sighted off the coast of Vella Lavella and it was also strafed and left burning. The steamer was again sighted one hour later by the evening patrol who reported it completely destroyed.
Considerable difficulty was experienced with the coordination and operation of the fighter direction centers in the earlier phases of the Vella Lavella operation. The first reason for this was unreliable communication facilities which may be directly attributed to lack of properly trained and indoctrinated personnel and failure to initially provide the necessary adequate equipment and spare parts. The second cause was lack of radar coverage due to natural disadvantages of the terrain coupled with the use of "second-hand equipment" lacking the necessary spare parts to obtain optimum operations. The last reason was poor training or lack of experience on the part of some fighter directors. The poor communications and the poor radar coverage obtained resulted in a lack of necessary information for the fighter directors. Detailed reports of these deficiencies have been made through appropriate channels.
Enemy tactics continued to consist of night raids for harassing effect and caused minor damage on some occasions. During this period the Japanese first used phantom targets in the New Georgia area for the purpose of deceiving our radars. While the exact nature of these phantom targets has not yet been determined their effect was to produce a radar indiction at one location while the plane would turn and approach from another direction. These tactics were highly effective in confusing our AA fire control at first but our radar operators soon learned to detect the phantoms, principally by the fact that they had very little motion compared with the movement of a plane. Enemy float planes also continued to harass our PT boats at night.
Because of the dwindling number of essential ground support missions and the predominance of strategic air missions in enemy territory, Commander Aircraft South Pacific recommended that Commander Aircraft New Georgia be removed from the Operational control of the New Georgia Occupation Force and become a task unit commander of Commander Aircraft Solomons. This was approved by Commander South Pacific and became effective on 23 September, 1943. On this same date Brigadier General James T. Moore, USMC, relieved Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy, USMC, as Commander Aircraft New Georgia. General Mulcahy retained command of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing.
On the same date the first successful landings and take-offs were made on the strip at Barakoma, Vella Lavella by one utility plane and four F4U's. This strip was in commission from this date on but because of the lack of dispersal areas and plane servicing crews aircraft were not based here until 17 October. Lt. Col. Perry O. Parmelee was Air Operations Officer at Barakoma. The Air Operations Officer of any outlying field such as Barakoma and Segi controlled all tactical operations from that field in accordance with operations orders of ComAir New Georgia and ComAirSols. He was assisted by operations watch officers, intelligence officers, and, if necessary because of wide separation from other fighter director centers, by a complete fighter direction set-up. He also exercised operational control of local AA and of aircraft servicing units.
In accordance with dispatch orders from ComAirSoPac the New Georgia Air Command ceased to exist at 2400 on 20 October, and its duties were absorbed by ComAirSols who moved from Guadalcanal to Munda at that time. The personnel of the Forward Echelon, Second Marine Aircraft Wing on being relieved of duty at Munda had been withdrawing to Efate in groups since 16 October. The last contingent departed from Munda on 23 October.
No ammunition was expended by personnel of the Air Command during this campaign. No records are available of ammunition expended by aircraft operating under the tactical control of this command, because of the fact that these units were not under its administrative control.

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1200, 25 August, 1943, 1200, 26 August, 1943.

Two New Zealand P-40's, sent by ComAirSols to search the Choiseul area for targets and to return to Segi to augment their VF strength, located three boats, between 60 and 100 feet in length near Kakasa at 1630 Love. All three were strafed, two blowing up and the third burning violently. These boats were described as having a pointed bow, cabin on deck forward and a well aft. There was no sign of crews or any activity, and the boats were well camouflaged with leaves and foliage.

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1200, 26 August 1943, 1200, 27 August 1943.

FIGHTER CONTACTS
The only engagement with enemy planes occurred at about 1550 Love when Jap VF attempted to intercept a strike on three Liberator Squadrons on Kahili. Part of the escort was made up from VF based on Munda. 8 Corsairs, 9 N.Z. P-40's and 3 Airacobras made up the Munda share of the escort.
Contact was made with 20-30 Zekes, Haps and Tony's at 17,000 - 23,000 feet. The score from our VF: Corsairs 3 Zekes, 3 Tony's destroyed; N.Z. P-40's - 1 Zeke, 1 Hap destroyed:
Airacobras unreported. Four of the eight Corsairs assigned this mission returned due to engine trouble and did not make contact. All our planes returned. Capt. Aldrich, VMF-215 returned wounded slightly with his plane shot up and made a safe landing.

NOTE
The Kakasa area seems to be the best point for close observation in the area, as it shows signs of much activity, especially barge concentrations. It will receive attention whenever possible.
At 1630 Love 5 N.Z. P-40's strafed a small steamer and a launch at Buri, (North tip of Ganongga), reported by a VF patrol earlier in the day. Both boats were strafed thoroughly and set afire. All planes dive bombed with their belly tanks afterward to spread the flames.

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1200, August 31, 1943. 1200, September 1, 1943.

At the end of their routine patrol over Vella Lavella, 4 RNZAF P-40's on orders at 1730L/31 strafed the same two barges in Timbala Bay which had previously been hit by the F4U's at 1325L/31. Again these barges did not burn but the pilots said they were sure they were rendered useless.

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1200, September 3, 1943, 1200, September 4, 1943.

PILOTS RESCUED
Sgt. Pirie, RNZAF, on B-24 escort on September 3, made a good water landing and slid onto a reef 3 miles north of Simbolando before 1400L/3. Another plane guided a Higgins boat to the spot to complete rescue. 5 P-39's later destroyed the plane.

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1200, September 12, 1943, 1200, September 13, 1943.

RESCUE
Sqdn. Leader P. G. Newton, CO of N.Z. #17 Fighter Sqdn. bailed out of his P-40 at 1525L/12, when his engine failed and his plane caught fire. He landed off Wana Wana Island and was quickly picked up. He was transferred to a Dumbo sent from Munda and landed at Munda at 1645L/12. Newton had been on Vella Lavella patrol.

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1200, 28 September 1943 1200, 29 September 1943.

ESCORT MISSION

Sixteen RNZAF P-40s who escorted TBFs and SBDs from Guadalcanal to Kakasa, Choiseul at about 0940L/29 landed here after the strike. They reported seeing nothing but smoke.

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1200, 29 September 1943, 1200, 30 September 1943.

Twelve NZ P-40s took off at 1220L/29 to search for the missing B-24. Four of them searched a 12 mile strip of Bougainville Strait, but saw no evidence of the B-24, call 21V26.
The other 8 P-40s searched the Choiseul coast for the B-24 and for targets of opportunity. They saw no signs of the missing plane but strafed and set afire a barge at Sambi Pt. The mission landed at 1430.

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1200, 30 September 1943. 1200, 1 October 1943.

Eight P-38s took off at 0848L/1 and 9 RNZAF P-40s at 0910L/1 to cover T.G. 31.6. They contacted 8 Vals and 4 Zeros between 0945 and 1000 Love just N of Barakoma. The Zeros were at 15,000 feet, the friendly flights at 10,000. Two P-38 pilots, Pederson and Hopkins, and 2 P-40 pilots saw a Val get a direct hit on an LST, setting it all aflame. Another bomb was seen to hit the water. The P-38s chased the Zeros and fired on them with no results. FDO, Vella Lavella called them back to cover the ships.

An SBD routine trip was made to Segi from 0945 to 1107L/1. A PBO landed here with NZ passengers from Guadalcanal at 1030L/1 and took off to return at 1304L/1.

[davidd]

I believe FDO = Fighter Direction Officer (presume gives directions to Allied fighter formations based on radar observations, etc.), possibly located on nearby island, or aboard US Navy ship.

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1200, 1 October 1943, 1200, 2 October 1943.

INTERCEPTION

Twenty-four VF (4 F4Us of VMF-222, 8 F4Us of VMF-213 4 U.S. P-40s and 8 RNZAF P-40s) of a total cover of 45 VF on station at 1430L/1 contacted 15 to 27 Vals and 5 to 15 Zeros off Boko Pt, Vella Lavella, at 22,000 to 23,000 feet. Our Planes were initially at 21,000 feet. Without any loss to us beyond some 20mm in the wings of NZ P-40s, 7 Vals and 3 Zekes were shot down, and 2 Zekes smoked. Vals were seen to drop bombs near the ships, but without damage.

NOTE

Pierard, RNZAF pilot, reported that a P-39 or P-40 joined up with him and then crashed in the water 7 miles S of Sambi Pt. at 1440L/1. It is believed, however, that all planes then airborne have been accounted for.

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1200, 5 October 1943. 1200, 6 October 1943.

STRIKE COMMAND

Four routine SBD liaison missions were flown. The aerology hop was made from 0620 to 0745L/6. A RNZAF PBO took off for Segi at 1330L/5.

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1200, 6 October 1943, 1200, 7 October 1943.

Four RNZAF P-40s from Guadalcanal landed here at 1300L/6 to refuel following a barge strafe on the Choiseul coast.

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1200, 7 October 1943. 1200, 8 October 1943.

STRAFING

Eight RNZAF P-40s landed here at 0850L/8 following a mission of escorting 4 B-25s on a search of Choiseul. They reported that a barge was strafed at Wugi Pt. and another at Toitoi Island, but that neither burned. They saw a barge floating near Moli Island, 2 life rafts bearing 80 degrees, 75 miles from Munda and one life raft 40 miles N of Munda, all empty.

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1200, 16 October 1943, 1200, 17 October 1943

CORSAIR STRAFES FRIENDLY BARGE

Four Corsairs, which were part of the cover for the Kara strike, became lost for sometime in a heavy front. They sighted a barge loaded with men and believing they were in the Shortlands area, one Corsair went down to strafe the barge. A three second burst was put into the barge and not until he pulled up and recognised Kolombangara did the pilot realise his mistake. Upon arriving back at his base, he reported his actions to his Commander.

Authorities at Vella reveal that the barge, 1 mile off SE tip of Vella was loaded with New Zealand troops. Results of the strafing were Blackmore, USNR, killed: Sorrels, USNR, wounded and two New Zealand privated wounded, one serious.

[ErrolC]

May 13, 2021 23:59:29 GMT 12 aircraftclocks said:

1200, 5 October 1943. 1200, 6 October 1943.

STRIKE COMMAND

Four routine SBD liaison missions were flown. The aerology hop was made from 0620 to 0745L/6. A RNZAF PBO took off for Segi at 1330L/5.

For those like me who can't remember every relevant usage of the USN designation system, a PBO is a Hudson.

Thanks for doing these!

[Dave Homewood]

May 13, 2021 10:57:54 GMT 12 aircraftclocks said:

1200, September 12, 1943, 1200, September 13, 1943.

RESCUE
Sqdn. Leader P. G. Newton, CO of N.Z. #17 Fighter Sqdn. bailed out of his P-40 at 1525L/12, when his engine failed and his plane caught fire. He landed off Wana Wana Island and was quickly picked up. He was transferred to a Dumbo sent from Munda and landed at Munda at 1645L/12. Newton had been on Vella Lavella patrol.

This only tells part of the story. When Guy Newton went into the water, his wingman that day was Geoff Highet, who told me he was on his first ever operational patrol. He stayed with Newton, circling him, while the rest of the squadron carried on. Geoff said he spotted a large native canoe leave the shore with several natives in it, and they were powering through the surf towards Newton. Geoff knew that the Catalina was on its way, but he also knew from briefings they'd had that the natives in that area were considered as hostile, as they'd aligned with the Japanese. In the end he decided to strafe the canoe to either sink them or make them think twice about what they were doing. He fired his guns and the rounds straddled the canoe. They took fright and turned around, heading back to shore. Then the Catalina turned up. Newton apparently was very grateful he had the forethought to keep the natives away rather than assume they were there to rescue him.