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Post by Marcus on Aug 1, 2022 20:05:19 GMT 12
Hi all.
I would be interested to hear your views on the following:
The war in Ukraine is entering its seventh month. As an ex infantryman I have been thinking about several aspects of the military operational side of the conflict. The following caveat must be taken into consideration when reading my comments. I do not have in-depth knowledge of the military tactics used by the combatant forces in the present war as all the info at my disposal is sourced from public and social media and as we know both these media sources have their limitations.
Recent asymmetrical wars, those mostly involving western nations have seen the increased use and importance of special forces, specialised forces (not to be confused with actual special forces) and PMC Private Military Contractors. The increase and expanded use of PGM (Precision Guided Munitions) has also played a more prominent and significant role in the planning and execution of military operations during the past 30 years.
One of the factors behind the use of small/er but highly trained special forces and the use of PGM’s in all its forms has been the drive by governments and their military planners to limit the number of own force casualties on the battlefield. The number of active duty troops in most western countries have been declining steadily during the post Cold War era, notwithstanding the War on Terror (2001 - 2021)
The present war in the Ukraine seems to have refocused on the role of the PBI (Poor Bloody Infantry) Although PGM and special Forces have and are being employed by both sides in the conflict the role and importance of the grunt on the ground has once again risen to prominence. The old military doctrine that only the infantry can hold ground is being highlighted again in the mostly conventional war being waged by Russia against Ukraine.
Am I correct in my assumptions? Will this mean that western military forces will re-emphasise the mass use of long range artillery, mass use of armour and the expansion of large conventional infantry brigades. Will there be less of an emphasis on attack helicopters and close air support aircraft like the A10 and SU-25 on the conventional battlefield of tomorrow due to the preponderance of highly effective MANPADS. Are we going back to similar tactics most of the major combatants used in WW2?
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Post by nuuumannn on Sept 19, 2022 23:05:30 GMT 12
Hi all. I would be interested to hear your views on the following: Will this mean that western military forces will re-emphasise the mass use of long-range artillery, mass use of armour and the expansion of large conventional infantry brigades. Will there be less of an emphasis on attack helicopters and close air support aircraft like the A10 and SU-25 on the conventional battlefield of tomorrow due to the preponderance of highly effective MANPADS. Are we going back to similar tactics most of the major combatants used in WW2?
Hi Marcus, an interesting post and I'll offer what I can, as I do keep an eye on the course of things, more so from an aviation perspective simply because it's in my best interests to do so; I've reported on the aviation facets of the conflict for the site I write for. This doesn't mean I am the most knowledgeable nor the most well informed or connected, but I do try and remain as informed as I can through multiple sources, for a less biased view. This is a bit long, so I've thrown in a few piccies to break the monotony of the text wall.
So, firstly, the lessons. These are there to be learned by anyone observing with an eye to engineering military strategy, but as to whom they directly apply, well, that's different and specifically they will or will not apply to different state or non-state actors in different ways. I doubt it will change overall strategy very much for most first world countries' armed forces, but it might enhance awareness of how different weapon systems can be used in a tactical sense. We are already seeing various countries erecting and furthering research into unmanned aerial systems, although these have been an effective means of keeping personnel out of harm's way over a battlefield for years now, but the energy surrounding Ukraine's successful employment of UAVs, in particular the Baykar Bayraktar has been good for business for these types of aircraft. Baykar is designing more advanced UAVs as we speak.
As for aerial close support and the use of low altitude strike aircraft like the Su-25 and plausibly the A-10? It is worth noting that both the Russians and Ukrainians have employed this tactic, but both sides have suffered from the extensive use of MANPADS, which to be frank, is nothing unexpected. Ground fire has been a major killer of close support/battlefield attack aircraft since before WW2 - during that conflict, Hawker Typhoons conducting low-level strikes over France in the lead to and following Overlord suffered enormous losses. CWGC graves in the Normandy area have a lot of Typhoon pilots in them. During Vietnam, various Middle Eastern conflicts and even in the Falklands War the vulnerability of close support aircraft has been highlighted, the RAF's No.1 Sqn Harrier GR.3s in the Falklands all suffered damage from ground fire, with 40 percent of their number being lost to enemy fire.
New Zealander P.M. Price was a Typhoon pilot and is buried in Ranville CWGC Cemetery outside Ouistreham, France.
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Contemporary thought is that the A-10 and its ilk are heading the way of the dinosaur despite the rampant enthusiasm for the Warthog in the USA. Despite its inherent survivability, built in after lessons learned during Vietnam, the A-10 is not invulnerable and could easily be brought down. It is interesting to note that it also doesn't have a particularly good reputation among some military forces allied to the US in recent conflicts - in Afghanistan Allied commanders had even said they will not send troops to operate where A-10s are prevalent as close support aircraft - that big gun it has, not particularly accurate with a wide blast radius - the A-10 has a reputation as the highest killer of friendly forces of any US aircraft, and that's coming from data collected by the Pentagon!
The reality is that aerial close support is evolving, specifically because air strikes against armour and infantry can be carried out effectively by aircraft at much higher altitudes and sufficient distance from the battleground so as to not be directly threatened by anti-air systems, owing to PGMs and advanced network connectivity that gives battlefield tactical awareness previously unheard of. This kind of capability can only be afforded by the wealthiest countries, however, otherwise, the low-tech aerial ground pounder still plays an important part of the air strike capabilities of many armed forces around the world.
The Nanachang Q-5 is rapidly disappearing from the PLAAF, but this type of unsophisticated strike aircraft still serves in lots of world air forces.
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The unusual aspect behind this conflict that has started chins wagging is the way in which it has been conducted, specifically from the Russian perspective, and how backward their advances have been despite the Russian armed forces having access to advanced guided weapon systems. Troops and armour advancing along empty roads like it's the Steppes in 1944 - even the Ukrainian forces they are coming up against are saying the Russians are using very old and predictable tactics. Mind you, trench warfare has been employed across the Donbas region since 2014, much of the fighting within the east before the Russian invasion earlier this year was conducted in this fashion, the lines being drawn with distinct 'fronts', with troops occupying hand dug trenches supported by distant artillery - like I said, the lessons to be learned depends on how you view military strategy and what weapons and training you have available to your forces.
A complete contrast to the Russian strategy is still the 1991 Gulf War. The lessons from this haven't exactly been applied by the Russians and training within Western doctrine has meant that a smaller and less capable opponent in the Ukrainian armed forces has been able withstand the Russian advance to the extent that they have actively pushed the Russians rearward, as we have seen. I read an article by a US military commander who operated with Ukrainian forces during peacekeeping operations - Ukrainian troops have been employed in Africa for years and very recently have announced that they are withdrawing from the DRC to return to Ukraine - who stated that early on Ukrainian forces were a little undisciplined and less, say, tactically aware as their Western trained comrades, but given the training and the opportunity to learn within Western training structures has dramatically changed their abilities, and they have demonstrated remarkable resilience through imaginative use of sparse resources and through the training they have received and have applied to themselves.
Ukrainian combat aircraft have been using forward operating bases to reduce Russian air strikes from disabling their number.
 Su-27
As for tanks and artillery, I've read articles stating the end of the MBT is nigh, but don't believe it just yet. Again, how these weapons are applied and by whom differentiates their effectiveness. Accuracy of anti-tank weapons is still a contentious issue, but technological advances mean that tanks are definitely becoming more vulnerable even since the 1991 Gulf War, but the application of mobile ground fire still has a place in modern tactics, despite inherent vulnerability from the air. Forces employing such weapons should rely on localised air superiority, however. As for special forces, erm... Yes. Their use by armed forces who deploy them will see no change from this conflict. In fact, observers will probably analyse how their special forces could have made a difference to the conflict as it unfolded. The attack against Saki air base in the Crimea has been attributed to special forces, although sources do state PGMs as the likely source, nevertheless, if it was special forces, this conflict changes nothing in what they bring to the playing field.
Overall, as mentioned already, as students of military history - certainly the role I play in this, there are definitely lessons to be learned. As for serious actors involved in planning military strategy, from all over the world, they'll be watching - what this conflict has revealed is the parlous state of, specifically, Russian preparedness for war. It's long been known that Russian military training is nowhere near as comprehensive as that within Western nations' armed forces, so if anything, the Big Russian Bear will perhaps learn the most from this conflict...
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Post by thelensofhistory on Oct 30, 2022 18:48:29 GMT 12
IMO the war in Ukraine represents old lessons relearned. But concerning the ground war and infantry, the value and utility of combined arms are reinforced. Also, the ongoing defeat of Russian forces in Ukraine is the final nail in the coffin, for the special forces can do it all and Rumsfeld's light footprint schools of thought.
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