Post by corsair67 on May 25, 2006 15:22:34 GMT 12
I'm posting this article from The Australian as it maybe of interest to some of the forum, especially because NZ is mentioned as well. It's quite long, but interesting never-the-less.
Greg Sheridan: More soldiers, more firepower
The army is central to our military commitments, including any new intervention in East Timor
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 25, 2006.
THE possible need for Australia to send troops into East Timor demonstrates once more the fragility of Australia's security environment. It's worth stepping back from the immediate crisis to consider some of its long-term implications and, in particular, some of the underlying features of our international situation that it reveals.
These concerns include, among other things, the centrality of the army, the importance of Indonesia, the perplexing but growing importance of New Zealand in one particular sense, the difficulties of very small nations, and the narcissism of very small differences.
These are likely to be enduring dynamics in Australia's international situation. They deserve reflection.
Take the army. Under the catastrophic and now thoroughly discredited Defence of Australia doctrine, which was pioneered when Kim Beazley was defence minister, the army was the poor relation. All emphasis was given to air and sea assets to defend the moat to Australia's north. As a result the army was neglected in terms of manpower as well as equipment.
Yet today the army is central in our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Solomon Islands and in any new effort we might make in East Timor.
This shows that the need for a larger, more deployable army wholly transcends the debate on whether we should contribute to the broad international security order or concentrate on our region. Whatever we do and wherever we do it, the army is almost certain to be playing the central role.
But we should not make the fatal mistake of thinking of the army as a glorified gendarmerie. The army needs everything from high-speed war fighting capability through to counter-insurgent expertise, peace-keeping ability, disaster relief capacity and much more. But despite welcome increases in the budget, we are having the greatest difficulty recruiting the soldiers we need. There are several reasons for this. One is the dispersal of our soldiers to remote parts of Australia, a mad and unreformed legacy of the crazy Defence of Australia days.
Another is feeble and politically correct advertising, which makes the army sound like a slow siding of the public service gravy train instead of appealing to the patriotism and self-sacrifice of young people.
Still another is the incredible bureaucratic recruitment process. An outstanding young man of my acquaintance tried to join the army reserves at the beginning of his university career. Academically strong and a natural leader, he had been school captain, captain of the cricket team and a member of the rugby team, and he was motivated by a desire to make a contribution.
But the recruitment process was so slow and bureaucratic, there were so many unreturned phone calls and inexplicable delays, that by the time the reserve got around to him, his life had assumed a different rhythm, with different work and social obligations. He let the reserves pass. How often must that story be repeated?
Which brings us to New Zealand. This column has often been critical of New Zealand but on this occasion I want to pay it a tribute. In the mid-1980s, Wellington bugged out of the Western alliance by refusing to allow US nuclear armed or powered ships to visit. This was a grievous and foolish thing to do and has greatly diminished New Zealand's national power. Since then it has compounded this folly by virtually demolishing all of its high-end war-fighting capabilities.
However, New Zealand still produces large numbers of very high quality soldiers. It has also in recent years had an attack of strategic realism. Wellington was greatly shaken by Australia's negotiations for a free trade agreement with the US, which excluded New Zealand. It understood the danger of sliding into total irrelevance. So it has worked very hard, within the limits of its antique anti-nuclear policy, to repair its relationship with the US.
This has included making a contribution of soldiers to Afghanistan. They lack their own air support but they remain very good soldiers. Proportionately they are much more important in the Pacific, where they are motivated by a genuine desire to help and a realisation of Australia's importance to New Zealand. They have helped in Solomon Islands and stand ready to help in East Timor.
John Howard and Helen Clark are not natural political soul mates but they have worked hard at enabling this sort of co-operation. In this limited but vital index of supplying high-quality soldiers, Wellington has become more important.
Consider, too, what East Timor should mean for our understanding of Indonesia. East Timor is a proudly independent nation and Canberra will always respect its sovereignty, but it is also a fragile nation and effectively a strategic dependency of Australia process. Its present troubles are entirely home-grown. There is no evidence of Indonesian interference. But those professional anti-Indonesianists in Australia should consider just how effortlessly Indonesia could destabilise East Timor if it wanted to cause trouble for Dili, or for Canberra, and what an enormous crisis this would be for us.
A huge element of our security strategy for East Timor and Papua New Guinea is good relations with Indonesia. Anyone who tangles with that is a fool, and a dangerous fool.
Finally, although there are many things to love about East Timor, it is going to have many rough years ahead. It is an independent nation now and we must help it in every way we can. But its murderous internal conflicts demonstrate that independence does not solve every problem for small, underdeveloped nations.
Similarly the alleged ethnic conflict between those from the east of East Timor and those from the west of East Timor points up the narcissism of small differences.
This marvellous phrase, not my own of course, captures the pervasive reality that people who may be indistinguishable to an outsider will find differences to fight over if they want to. In reality, big ethnic differences are no more likely to lead to conflict than tiny ethnic differences.
What counts is development, traditions of co-existing and willingness to compromise political culture. The South Pacific is full of the narcissism of small differences that we are often called on to adjudicate.
East Timor shows us that we need all the instruments of national power in our region. A big, capable army is an essential part of that.
Greg Sheridan: More soldiers, more firepower
The army is central to our military commitments, including any new intervention in East Timor
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 25, 2006.
THE possible need for Australia to send troops into East Timor demonstrates once more the fragility of Australia's security environment. It's worth stepping back from the immediate crisis to consider some of its long-term implications and, in particular, some of the underlying features of our international situation that it reveals.
These concerns include, among other things, the centrality of the army, the importance of Indonesia, the perplexing but growing importance of New Zealand in one particular sense, the difficulties of very small nations, and the narcissism of very small differences.
These are likely to be enduring dynamics in Australia's international situation. They deserve reflection.
Take the army. Under the catastrophic and now thoroughly discredited Defence of Australia doctrine, which was pioneered when Kim Beazley was defence minister, the army was the poor relation. All emphasis was given to air and sea assets to defend the moat to Australia's north. As a result the army was neglected in terms of manpower as well as equipment.
Yet today the army is central in our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Solomon Islands and in any new effort we might make in East Timor.
This shows that the need for a larger, more deployable army wholly transcends the debate on whether we should contribute to the broad international security order or concentrate on our region. Whatever we do and wherever we do it, the army is almost certain to be playing the central role.
But we should not make the fatal mistake of thinking of the army as a glorified gendarmerie. The army needs everything from high-speed war fighting capability through to counter-insurgent expertise, peace-keeping ability, disaster relief capacity and much more. But despite welcome increases in the budget, we are having the greatest difficulty recruiting the soldiers we need. There are several reasons for this. One is the dispersal of our soldiers to remote parts of Australia, a mad and unreformed legacy of the crazy Defence of Australia days.
Another is feeble and politically correct advertising, which makes the army sound like a slow siding of the public service gravy train instead of appealing to the patriotism and self-sacrifice of young people.
Still another is the incredible bureaucratic recruitment process. An outstanding young man of my acquaintance tried to join the army reserves at the beginning of his university career. Academically strong and a natural leader, he had been school captain, captain of the cricket team and a member of the rugby team, and he was motivated by a desire to make a contribution.
But the recruitment process was so slow and bureaucratic, there were so many unreturned phone calls and inexplicable delays, that by the time the reserve got around to him, his life had assumed a different rhythm, with different work and social obligations. He let the reserves pass. How often must that story be repeated?
Which brings us to New Zealand. This column has often been critical of New Zealand but on this occasion I want to pay it a tribute. In the mid-1980s, Wellington bugged out of the Western alliance by refusing to allow US nuclear armed or powered ships to visit. This was a grievous and foolish thing to do and has greatly diminished New Zealand's national power. Since then it has compounded this folly by virtually demolishing all of its high-end war-fighting capabilities.
However, New Zealand still produces large numbers of very high quality soldiers. It has also in recent years had an attack of strategic realism. Wellington was greatly shaken by Australia's negotiations for a free trade agreement with the US, which excluded New Zealand. It understood the danger of sliding into total irrelevance. So it has worked very hard, within the limits of its antique anti-nuclear policy, to repair its relationship with the US.
This has included making a contribution of soldiers to Afghanistan. They lack their own air support but they remain very good soldiers. Proportionately they are much more important in the Pacific, where they are motivated by a genuine desire to help and a realisation of Australia's importance to New Zealand. They have helped in Solomon Islands and stand ready to help in East Timor.
John Howard and Helen Clark are not natural political soul mates but they have worked hard at enabling this sort of co-operation. In this limited but vital index of supplying high-quality soldiers, Wellington has become more important.
Consider, too, what East Timor should mean for our understanding of Indonesia. East Timor is a proudly independent nation and Canberra will always respect its sovereignty, but it is also a fragile nation and effectively a strategic dependency of Australia process. Its present troubles are entirely home-grown. There is no evidence of Indonesian interference. But those professional anti-Indonesianists in Australia should consider just how effortlessly Indonesia could destabilise East Timor if it wanted to cause trouble for Dili, or for Canberra, and what an enormous crisis this would be for us.
A huge element of our security strategy for East Timor and Papua New Guinea is good relations with Indonesia. Anyone who tangles with that is a fool, and a dangerous fool.
Finally, although there are many things to love about East Timor, it is going to have many rough years ahead. It is an independent nation now and we must help it in every way we can. But its murderous internal conflicts demonstrate that independence does not solve every problem for small, underdeveloped nations.
Similarly the alleged ethnic conflict between those from the east of East Timor and those from the west of East Timor points up the narcissism of small differences.
This marvellous phrase, not my own of course, captures the pervasive reality that people who may be indistinguishable to an outsider will find differences to fight over if they want to. In reality, big ethnic differences are no more likely to lead to conflict than tiny ethnic differences.
What counts is development, traditions of co-existing and willingness to compromise political culture. The South Pacific is full of the narcissism of small differences that we are often called on to adjudicate.
East Timor shows us that we need all the instruments of national power in our region. A big, capable army is an essential part of that.
