Post by corsair67 on Apr 14, 2008 13:00:33 GMT 12
Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965-1972
by - Marshall L. Michel III.
Paperback: 352 pages.
Publisher: US Naval Institute Press (March 23, 2007).
ISBN-10: 1591145198.
Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 5.9 x 1.1 inches.
This is another book that has been waiting in the stack of "to be read" for a few months now, but finally on the weekend I had some time to read it.
This is a very well researched and readable book which pulls no punches in highlighting many of the deficiencies in USAF and USN's air warfare tactics and also some of the equipment used by both arms during the Vietnam War.
The reliance on air-to-air missiles was a major cause of concern during this period, especially when the AIM-7E Sparrow had a successful kill rate of only around 8%. Not that the AIM-9B Sidewinder was that much better at only around 15% - and as for the AIM-4D Falcon - well, lets not even go there! In some documented cases, up to 8 missiles were fired (all within the missile's operational parameters) by US fighters at a single MiG - but still without any of them hitting the target!
Even so, it still took a lot of effort to convince senior USAF officers (and even some fighter pilots!) that a gun would be beneficial to aircraft like the F-4 Phantom. Once a centreline gun pod was added to USAF F-4s, the MiG kill rate increased dramatically as closer range shots could now be taken, and it also gave the USAF pilots another option if/when missiles failed to knock a MiG down.
Internal politics also caused much grief for the USAF and USN. For example, senior USAF officers refused to consider adapting the AIM-9D (developed by the USN) for its aircraft, or adopting the two-jet "loose deuce" fighter formation - even though both were being used to great effect by USN pilots over North Vietnam. The USAF stuck with the outdated fighter formations that had been in use since WWII, and paid a heavy price in jets lost to North Vietnamese MiG-21 hit and run tactics.
The book also details the ever changing technological battle between the US and the North Vietnamese for control of the skies over North Vietnam. Just when the US had the upperhand, the North Vietnamese changed their tactics to swing the advantage back in their direction again. Also the MiG 17, 19 and 21 aircraft used by the North Vietnamese had many drawbacks, but when used in conjunction with their excellent Ground Control Interception operators and the SA-2 Guideline SAM, they managed to exact a heavy toll on the USAF and USN at various times throughout the war.
Overall, a very good book and highly recommended.
by - Marshall L. Michel III.
Paperback: 352 pages.
Publisher: US Naval Institute Press (March 23, 2007).
ISBN-10: 1591145198.
Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 5.9 x 1.1 inches.
This is another book that has been waiting in the stack of "to be read" for a few months now, but finally on the weekend I had some time to read it.
This is a very well researched and readable book which pulls no punches in highlighting many of the deficiencies in USAF and USN's air warfare tactics and also some of the equipment used by both arms during the Vietnam War.
The reliance on air-to-air missiles was a major cause of concern during this period, especially when the AIM-7E Sparrow had a successful kill rate of only around 8%. Not that the AIM-9B Sidewinder was that much better at only around 15% - and as for the AIM-4D Falcon - well, lets not even go there! In some documented cases, up to 8 missiles were fired (all within the missile's operational parameters) by US fighters at a single MiG - but still without any of them hitting the target!
Even so, it still took a lot of effort to convince senior USAF officers (and even some fighter pilots!) that a gun would be beneficial to aircraft like the F-4 Phantom. Once a centreline gun pod was added to USAF F-4s, the MiG kill rate increased dramatically as closer range shots could now be taken, and it also gave the USAF pilots another option if/when missiles failed to knock a MiG down.
Internal politics also caused much grief for the USAF and USN. For example, senior USAF officers refused to consider adapting the AIM-9D (developed by the USN) for its aircraft, or adopting the two-jet "loose deuce" fighter formation - even though both were being used to great effect by USN pilots over North Vietnam. The USAF stuck with the outdated fighter formations that had been in use since WWII, and paid a heavy price in jets lost to North Vietnamese MiG-21 hit and run tactics.
The book also details the ever changing technological battle between the US and the North Vietnamese for control of the skies over North Vietnam. Just when the US had the upperhand, the North Vietnamese changed their tactics to swing the advantage back in their direction again. Also the MiG 17, 19 and 21 aircraft used by the North Vietnamese had many drawbacks, but when used in conjunction with their excellent Ground Control Interception operators and the SA-2 Guideline SAM, they managed to exact a heavy toll on the USAF and USN at various times throughout the war.
Overall, a very good book and highly recommended.
