|
|
Post by Dave Homewood on Aug 20, 2007 15:58:26 GMT 12
I see that the sad truth about the demise of the Italian ship, the Nino Bixio, has been revealed.
The Nino Bixio was sunk by a British submarine in the Med, when it was sailing from North Africa home to Italy, on the 17th of August 1942 - 65 years ago.
Aboard the ship were around 3000 Allied prisoners of war, and when the submarine HMS Turluent put a torpedo into the ship, 300 PoW's were killed (including 117 New Zealanders of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force).
It has always been thought that the submarine and Royal Navy high command were unaware that the Italian transport was carrying Allied PoW's. However files just released confirm they did indeed know it was a prisoner transport and the order was given to sink the ship and sacrifice the men in order to prevent the Nino Bixio escaping and returning to North Africa with more supplies and Axis troops.
It's a sad decision that ruined many lives. Some of those aboard were from Cambridge. One such survivor created a memorial in the front garden of his Thornton Road, Cambridge, home dedicated to his lost comrades and friends. It was in the form of a raised concrete structure with red scoria on top and the words NINO BIXIO in white painted onto the scoria. He kept it immaculate till his death, and his son, who is a little simple, sadly let it deteriorate to the point where he decided to have it removed.
To learn that those 117 young kiwis died perhaps needlessly, as did their allied comrades, just highlights the senselessness of some wartime decisions.
Still, one wonders, had the ship returned to North Africa laiden with fresh troops and ammunition and supplied, how many other young NZ'ers and Allies might have been killed by that action. So it's difficult to make a call on this.
|
|
|
|
Post by flyjoe180 on Aug 21, 2007 10:49:14 GMT 12
In war some decisions are made according to the situation, and regardless of the human aspect. Sad I agree, but someone had the task of making that decision and they must have had sleepless nights ever since.
|
|
|
|
Post by rossherb on Oct 29, 2012 15:26:04 GMT 12
In war some decisions are made according to the situation, and regardless of the human aspect. Sad I agree, but someone had the task of making that decision and they must have had sleepless nights ever since. This may be true in many other cases, but not when it comes to POW ships. When it comes to making a decision to deliberately exterminate your own troops, I wonder whether these decision makers conciously allowed the fact they were committing cold blooded murder to register on their conscience. "I was only doing my duty, etc etc" are the usual excuses used to placate any feelings of guilt such that they exonerate themselves in their own eyes and conscience - and of course, their military superiors. I don't think it bothered many of them at all. Sitting back in a war room and making a decision by virtual remote control that sinking a ship laden with POW's is a strategic imperative, rather than allowing it to get through and "possibly" return laden with fresh supplies and troops, is twisted and immoral logic imo. Surely, it is more intelligent to wait until the ship is returning and then sink it - far more strategically effective. I think it was accepted that sinking a vulnerable and relatively weakly protected target was far easier and less likely to invite repercussions from higher up than if the ship were attacked on its return, because it would then be more heavily protected and the british ships might get hit themselves. It was seen as better to sacrifice the thousands of defenceless POW's in order to minimise the threat to a few submarines and crew... not so much that it would actually be able to get through and land fresh supplies and troops. No, I think a lot of these back room decision makers were too gung-ho and eager to take the soft option. |
|
|
|
Post by errolmartyn on Oct 29, 2012 16:32:01 GMT 12
In war some decisions are made according to the situation, and regardless of the human aspect. Sad I agree, but someone had the task of making that decision and they must have had sleepless nights ever since. This may be true in many other cases, but not when it comes to POW ships. When it comes to making a decision to deliberately exterminate your own troops, I wonder whether these decision makers conciously allowed the fact they were committing cold blooded murder to register on their conscience. "I was only doing my duty, etc etc" are the usual excuses used to placate any feelings of guilt such that they exonerate themselves in their own eyes and conscience - and of course, their military superiors. I don't think it bothered many of them at all. Sitting back in a war room and making a decision by virtual remote control that sinking a ship laden with POW's is a strategic imperative, rather than allowing it to get through and "possibly" return laden with fresh supplies and troops, is twisted and immoral logic imo. Surely, it is more intelligent to wait until the ship is returning and then sink it - far more strategically effective. I think it was accepted that sinking a vulnerable and relatively weakly protected target was far easier and less likely to invite repercussions from higher up than if the ship were attacked on its return, because it would then be more heavily protected and the british ships might get hit themselves. It was seen as better to sacrifice the thousands of defenceless POW's in order to minimise the threat to a few submarines and crew... not so much that it would actually be able to get through and land fresh supplies and troops. No, I think a lot of these back room decision makers were too gung-ho and eager to take the soft option. There were no 'POW ships' as such, to my best knowledge, but there were ships (and sometimes submarines and aircraft) that occasionally included PoWs in their loads. An attacking submarine, ship or aircraft simply had no way of knowing if the target about to be attacked was carrying PoWs or not. Errol |
|
|
|
Post by rossherb on Oct 30, 2012 14:53:56 GMT 12
There were no 'POW ships' as such, to my best knowledge, but there were ships (and sometimes submarines and aircraft) that occasionally included PoWs in their loads. An attacking submarine, ship or aircraft simply had no way of knowing if the target about to be attacked was carrying PoWs or not. Errol Read the very first post in this thread. While Nino Bixio was not marked as a hospital or POW transport the mediteranean allied forces were notified it was carrying POW's, before it sailed. It is my opinion that British military command were mostly of the view that any service personnel who signed up were prepared to die for king and country so if they surrendered or were captured they could still be of service to those carrying on the fight. After all, they were still serving personnel despite being POW's. The only difference was that the back room boys were making the decision to use them as sacrificial lambs instead of the troops dying in battle. Sacrifice the many for the good of the few, or, you signed on to die and we can still use you, type of logic. Your penalty for being captured is the same as if you had all died in the field of battle so to speak. By taking out the POW ships (even though notified of their cargo) whilst they were weakly protected was seen as a strategically better option than waiting until its return laden with fresh supplies and troops, when it would be heavily protected. The threat to the British navy in taking on a returning ship was thus far greater, so it was seen as a better option to sacrifice those who had the misfortune to be captured and take the ships out while unprotected, ie. the soft option. These POW's were seen as fulfilling their duty and honouring their pledge to to die for king and country. Others see it as cold blooded murder. My uncle was one of those poor unfortunate POW's (2/28 batallion) who died on the Nino Bixio. The captain of HMS Turbulent logged a total of about 100,000 tons of destroyed shipping (1 cruiser 1 destroyer, the rest mostly merchant or low threat). And for that he was awarded a VC... en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Wallace_LintonGreat job JW. Pity you never had to look the enemy in the eye like the diggers of the 2/28 batallion - and they didn't get the VC more richly deserved than you. |
|
|
|
Post by errolmartyn on Oct 30, 2012 19:59:12 GMT 12
In recognition of this achievement, and the gallentry of Turbulent's crew, her commander, John Wallace Linton, DSO, DSC, RN was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross on 25 May 1943. The citation read:
The King has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross for great valour in command of HM Submarines to Commander John Wallace Linton, DSO, DSC, Royal Navy. From the outbreak of war until HMS Turbulent's last patrol, Commander Linton was constantly in command of submarines, and during that time inflicted great damage on the enemy. He sank one cruiser, one destroyer, one U-boat, twenty-eight supply ships, some 100,000 tons in all, and destroyed three trains by gunfire. In his last year he spent two hundred and fifty-four days at sea, submerged for nearly half the time, and his ship was hunted thirteen times and had two hundred and fifty depth-charges aimed at her. His many and brilliant successes were due to his constant activity and skill, and the daring which never failed him when there was an enemy to be attacked. On one occasion, for instance, in HMS Turbulent, he sighted a convoy of two merchantmen and two destroyers in mist and moonlight. He worked round ahead of the convoy and dived to attack it as it passed through the moon's rays. On bringing his sights to bear he found himself right ahead of a destroyer. Yet he held his course 'till the destroyer was almost on top of him, and, when his sights came on the convoy, he fired. His great courage and determination were rewarded. He sank one merchantman and one destroyer outright, and set the other Merchantmen on fire so that she blew up.
Errol
|
|
|
|
Post by rossherb on Oct 30, 2012 23:18:24 GMT 12
Yes, I'll agree that the citation reads extremely well of the man. That is often the case when written up by someone long after the event, especially when justifying the awarding of the VC. The point I would make is that if he were such an astute tactician and brave commander as described in the citation why did he often pick on the soft targets? Why not target the armed destroyers instead of the POW merchant ship? I'll admit the MTB's are a bit hard for a sub to hit but they are only a problem if the sub is on the surface. Too difficult, and they have depth charges, so stay well clear and you may make it out alive. Too bad about all those defenceless POW's sitting there like ducks on a pond. It almost sounds as if he was trying for an award for sinking the most tonnage rather than taking out the most dangerous enemy ships. Surely one would think this tactic would be the most strategically effective way of preventing further damage to allied forces from armed warships. The thing is he must have known he was targetting a POW ship.... QUOTE from www.aifpow.com/part_1__missing_in_action,_believed_pow/chapter_4__transportation_of_pow/a._by_sea The embarkation procedure was such that those POW from A-L were allotted to the "Sestriere" and those from M -Z to the "Nino Bixio". By August 16, loading was complete and the two ships left Benghazi Harbour. They were escorted by two destroyers, the "Da Rocca" and the "Saetta" and two motor torpedo boats. Neither ship was marked as prison ships, or carried Red Cross identification or lettering. Again the Mediterraean authorities were advised that the ships carried POW.
On that same day, the Royal Navy submarine "Turbulent" (formerly named the "Trieste") commanded by Lt. Commander "Tubby" Linton, VC, was on patrol off Novarino. About 3 o'clock that afternoon, it sighted the convoy and despite its strong protective cover, "Tubby" Linton attacked, with a salvo of three torpedoes narrowly missing the "Sestriere" but hitting the "Nino Bixio" in Number 1 hold forward, in the engine room amidship and glancing off the rudder, but doing enough damage to render it useless. No. 1 hold was crammed with Allied POW, in the main Australian, New Zealand and South African and the torpedo burst through the skin of the ship and exploded inside. Less than half of the 300 men in this hold survived. The 2/28th Infantry Battalion of the AIF lost 29 men alone from the 39 Australians killed. 118 New Zealanders died. |
|
|
|
Post by errolmartyn on Oct 31, 2012 10:43:30 GMT 12
"Yes, I'll agree that the citation reads extremely well of the man. That is often the case when written up by someone long after the event, especially when justifying the awarding of the VC."
25 May 1943 (in the middle of the war) is hardly 'long after the event''
"The thing is he must have known he was targetting a POW ship."
"must have known"? In other words you don't really know at all.
Errol
|
|
|
|
Post by steveh on Nov 1, 2012 8:45:55 GMT 12
I hear the sound of an axe being ground here. I only know what I've read on here & previously about the tragedy of submarines scoring own goals, both in the Med & Pacific, but I find it incredible to suggest that Linton intentionally targeted these ships because they were soft targets & probably quite unworthy of the man. I certainly beleive it is a mistake to try & interprete the fog of war with the benefit of 20/02 hindsite when everything might seem so much clearer but then again so much relevant information may be lacking. I wonder does Rossherb have some family connection to this tragedy or just a bee in his bonnet?
Steve.
|
|
|
|
Post by errolmartyn on Nov 1, 2012 9:30:51 GMT 12
I hear the sound of an axe being ground here. I only know what I've read on here & previously about the tragedy of submarines scoring own goals, both in the Med & Pacific, but I find it incredible to suggest that Linton intentionally targeted these ships because they were soft targets & probably quite unworthy of the man. I certainly beleive it is a mistake to try & interprete the fog of war with the benefit of 20/02 hindsite when everything might seem so much clearer but then again so much relevant information may be lacking. I wonder does Rossherb have some family connection to this tragedy or just a bee in his bonnet? Steve. Steve, He lost an uncle in the Nino Bixio (see post #4). Errol |
|
|
|
Post by davidd on Nov 1, 2012 11:56:17 GMT 12
It seems to me that the Allies strongly suspected, or even knew for a fact that certain convoys departing North Africa were carrying Allied POWs, but I doubt that a British submarine captain knew that a certain ship in his sights was any particular vessel, and that it for certain included Allied POWs as part of its "cargo". He therefore would have the "choice" (luxury?) of not attacking ANY known enemy merchant ships (and therefore nullifying the very presence of his own war vessel), or sinking them all knowing he was likely killing Allied POWs. I do not know whether Allied submarine commanders knew for certain at this time that it was often the practice for such ships' captains to batten the POWs below decks which menat that the latter were totally doomed should their ship be sunk, although this practice may not have been that widespread. These are inponderable questions that the British submarine commanders had to wrestle with, which must be realized before drawing hard conclusions as to culpability for any actions they took, and the knowledge they possessed of enemy actions and procedures, some of the latter being definitely criminal in anyone's language. There was certainly a very thick "fog of war" at work here. I briefly knew a NZ soldier who was aboard one these Italian merchant ships, and he reckoned that the ship in line behind his and the one in front were both sunk with heavy loss of Allied POWs, but he was just lucky. His mob were battend down without any means of escape.
David D
|
|
|
|
Post by rossherb on Nov 1, 2012 14:54:26 GMT 12
If we look at the facts of the VC citation. JW Linton was credited with sinking 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 U-boat and 28 supply ships, plus some shore based targets. The supply ships would have included some POW ships. From this ratio (3:28) it seems to me that he certainly did have a preference to take out the "soft" targets in preference to more dangerous ships - and this can't have been just due to the confusion of battle in the fog of war. In the case of the two POW ships Nino Bixio and Sestrierre - they were escorted by 2 destroyers and 2 MTB's. Obviously, the larger targets (POW ships) were the biggest, slowest and therefore easiest to target. Turbulent fired only 3 torpedoes, all of which hit the Nino Bixio (the third glanced of the rudder). Doesn't seem like the sort of mistake one might make due to confusion or fog of war to me. In fact it looks more like precise targetting. Why would a sub commander NOT target the most dangerous of the ships in this convoy? After all they posed the greatest threat to him and his crew. Take them out and he has less to worry about in the future. But of course, tangling with 2 destroyers is no easy feat and it would seem he chose the much safer option to stand off some distance and pick off the slowest and easiest targets and then get the hell out of there before the destroyers could find him. It was immediately after this action that Linton was awarded the DSO. My uncle was apparently up on deck playing cards with another POW who was suffering dysentery. One of the torpedoes detonated directly under where they were located and it was the end for him. Left a wife and 2 kids (one still alive in Canberra). His commemorative plaque rests in Kings Park, Perth. (attachment) Attachments:
|
|
|
|
Post by errolmartyn on Nov 1, 2012 16:28:06 GMT 12
"it seems to me that he certainly did have a preference to take out the "soft" targets in preference to more dangerous ships - and this can't have been just due to the confusion of battle in the fog of war."
I am not aware of the loss rate for Allied submarines but, apart from the early part of the war, the German U-boat force found attacking escorts or (mostly) escorted (and sometimes armed) merchant ships a most hazardous activity. Nearly 800 U-boats were sunk taking with them the lives of 28,000 crew members - a 75% casualty rate - the highest of all the German forces, higher even than that suffered by RAF's Bomber Command.
As with the Germans, the main task of the Allied submarine force was to sink merchant ships and while its losses were lower it was still a very dangerous business. There was certainly nothing 'soft' about it.
War is a cruel place, and losses to friendly-fire all are not uncommon (witness Afghanistan today). The air-war in WWII was no different, incidentally - as the recent publication of the first of five (!) volumes on the subject by British author Brian Cull testify.
Errol
|
|
|
|
Post by steveh on Nov 1, 2012 17:48:02 GMT 12
Thanks for the heads up on that errol & my apologies to Ross for having missed this. I would refer to Davidd's post as having said much of what I was thinking re the passing of info to sub commanders & the ability of said commanders to positively ID all targets. Much as I have tremendous sympathy with Ross for his loss, having also lost an Uncle during this war, albeit in less contentious circumstances, maybe that also enables me to see that perhaps Ross' objectivity in this instance is being clouded by his loss. It strikes me there is much information lacking before we can come to a reasonable conclusion here.
Steve.
|
|
|
|
Post by rossherb on Nov 2, 2012 1:25:19 GMT 12
Not a problem Steve... I do have somewhat of a grudge against JW Linton due to the death of a defenceless relative who happened to be a POW. I cannot see how Linton was considered worthy of the DSO let alone the VC (posthumously). If we look at the log of HMS Turbulent targets in the last 12 months March '42 to March '43 there is a preponderance of non-military targets. In fact his record against naval ships was quite poor. One of his destroyer "kills" was the "wreck" Strale, and apart from the sinking of the destroyer Emanuelle Passagno, all except a submarine tender were merchant or cargo vessels. Don't get me wrong, taking out merchant vessels which have not been notified as carrying POW's is fine by me, but I have a sneaking suspicion that Linton was a bit miffed at missing the Nino Bixio during an earlier encounter on July 4 1942, just over a month before he eventually torpedoed it. "Not going to get a way this time - and in broad daylight too", I can imagine him thinking. It certainly kept his "tonnage sunk" tally ticking along. German U-boat commanders competed for "tonnage sunk" and I don't doubt that British sub commanders were any different in this regard (unofficially, of course). Exerpt from; www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/history/other/sea/secondphonyThe young U-boat commanders, the German elite, competed with each other for tonnage sunk. Record of HMS Turbulent targets '42 - '43; www.rnsubs.co.uk/Boats/BoatDB2/index.php?id=1&BoatID=413&flag=boatWhile there may have been some excuse for the sinking of the POW transport SS Scillin (night attack by HMS Sahib), the Nino Bixio was attacked in broad daylight. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_ScillinPic of Nino Bixio; acms.sl.nsw.gov.au//item/itemLarge.aspx?itemID=456453She looks a pretty easy target. |
|
|
|
Post by errolmartyn on Nov 2, 2012 10:28:46 GMT 12
"If we look at the log of HMS Turbulent targets in the last 12 months March '42 to March '43 there is a preponderance of non-military targets."
Merchant ships were NOT non-military targets.
I'm very sorry for the loss of your uncle in the war (I lost one, too, as did many others theirs), but you need to get over your neverending and unsubstantiated persecution of Linton. It does you little credit and serves no useful purpose, in my view.
Errol
|
|
|
|
Post by rossherb on Nov 2, 2012 13:26:31 GMT 12
Correction accepted. Cargo and merchant vessels were strategic military targets. To adequately clarify what I meant I should perhaps have said "non-naval war vessel targets". Insofar as my opinion of Linton and whether he deserved his VC, I don't agree that my criticism is unjustified. I tend to agree with Bruce Haigh's opinion piece regarding posthumous awards; www.abc.net.au/unleashed/3888664.htmlExcerpts; In seeking to anoint heroes we have to be careful that we don't airbrush from the picture undesirables who might not fit the public perception of the type of person who should be worthy for elevation.... But the posthumous recognition of outstanding acts of wartime courage seems to me fraught with other possibilities. If the upside is for the Commonwealth, after consideration, to give an award for bravery hitherto unrecognised, surely the logical downside is to remove honours and awards unjustly, unfairly or dishonestly conferred.... Where does one draw the line? Trying to justify issuing an award which should be recommended at the time the act of bravery was undertaken seems fraught with present and future difficulty. So here we have a difference of opinion which cannot be resolved without access to personal papers and naval records, which undoubtedly are unlikely to see the light of day. With that I will say no more on the matter. Good day to you Group Captain... |
|
|
|
Post by Dave Homewood on Nov 2, 2012 13:35:52 GMT 12
Merchant vessels on both sides that carried military cargo were under Navy command, and usually carried some Navy members onboard the vessel too, and defensive weaponry. They were naval war vessels as far as I see it. And taking out a merchant ship carrying 1000 enemy troops, tanks and equipment to the front lines is just as important, if not more important, as taking out a destroyer that is escorting them, imho. It was all legitimate targets in wartime. The fact that occasionally the Allies took out their own men in these ships is sad, but it's a fact of war. And it happened in the Pacific as well as the European campaign.
|
|
|
|
Post by rossherb on Nov 2, 2012 13:58:11 GMT 12
And taking out a merchant ship carrying 1000 enemy troops, tanks and equipment to the front lines is just as important, if not more important, as taking out a destroyer that is escorting them, imho. It was all legitimate targets in wartime. I have no disagreement with taking out merchant ships carrying enemy troops and equipment. I am not convinced that the allies weren't aware that at least some of these merchant ships were carrying their own POW's, particularly as they were headed away from the middle east to Italy when hit. They were not heading into the war theatre carrying troops and equipment. These POW's had no say in how they met their end. It was decided for them by someone who chose to do so for reasons we will never know. And I don't agree with that old adage "all's fair in love and war". Sure, mistakes are sometimes made and are often unavoidable but the considerable number of POW ships targetted during WW2 don't quite justify the excuse of "mistakes" imo. |
|
|
|
Post by Dave Homewood on Nov 2, 2012 15:52:07 GMT 12
Does anyone know which Italian ship it was that was hit by an Allied torpedo whilst carrying prisoners locked in the hold, and the Italian crew managed to get close enough to shore that they all jumped off and ran for it, leaving hundreds of POW's including kiwis to drown as it slowly sank. A German soldier who was there got onto the ship and opened all the cages just in time and saved everyone except I think one person, and he was awarded the George Cross for it I beleive.
|
|
